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SEPARATE BUT EQUAL: MIRANDA’S
RIGHTS TO SILENCE AND COUNSEL
STEVEN P. GROSSMAN

*

Three decades ago, the Supreme Court created a dubious distinction
between the rights accorded to suspects in custody who invoke their right
to silence and who invoke their right to counsel. This distinction
significantly disadvantages those who do not have the good sense or good
fortune to specify they want an attorney when they invoke their right to
remain silent. This article argues that this distinction was flawed at its
genesis and that it has led to judicial decisions that are inconsistent, make
little sense, and permit police behavior that substantially diminishes the
right to silence as described in Miranda v. Arizona. The article does so by
demonstrating that the distinction is unsupportable either theoretically or
pragmatically. It then shows that two recent holdings of the Court have
paved the way for abolishing the distinction and developing an approach
that both reflects the reality of custodial interrogation and is consistent
with the principles behind the Fifth Amendment and the holding in
Miranda.
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INTRODUCTION

With two cases, decided in 1975 and 1981, the Supreme Court
created a significant distinction between the impact of a custodial
suspect’s decision to invoke his right to silence and his decision to
1
invoke his right to counsel. In Michigan v. Mosley, the Court held that
the police may resume questioning a suspect after he invokes his right to
silence, if three elements are met: First, the police must “scrupulously
honor” this invocation by cutting off questioning; second, the police
must wait a reasonable time and then administer the Miranda warnings
2
again, and; third, the suspect once again must waive his rights. In
3
Edwards v. Arizona, the Court took an entirely different approach to
4
subsequent interrogation of a suspect who invokes his right to counsel.
The Court reasoned in Edwards that because a defendant who invokes
his right to counsel is indicating his refusal to answer questions in a
custodial environment without the presence of a lawyer, he cannot be
reinterrogated without counsel present unless the suspect initiates the
5
questioning himself.
In a series of cases based on the holding in Edwards, the Court built
the wall separating the impact of invoking the right to counsel and the
6
right to silence higher. With its holding in Arizona v. Roberson, the
Court extended the Edwards “initiation protection” to situations in
which the suspect is being interrogated about a different crime than the
7
one for which he invoked his right to counsel.
In Minnick v.
8
Mississippi, the Court decided that even when the suspect actually
speaks with his counsel after invoking his right to counsel, the police
cannot question the suspect after a subsequent waiver unless the suspect
9
initiates the questioning or counsel is present during the questioning.
This article will argue that the distinction the Court drew between
invocation of the right to silence and the right to counsel was highly
10
questionable from its genesis in Mosley and Edwards. This distinction
1. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
2. Id. at 104–07.
3. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
4. Id. at 484.
5. Id. at 484–85.
6. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
7. Id. at 686–87.
8. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
9. Id. at 153.
10. See infra Part II.
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has led to significantly different judicial treatment of suspects who
invoke their right to counsel and those who invoke their right to silence,
a difference unsupported by either theoretical or pragmatic
11
justifications. The result of this differential treatment has been that
suspects who invoke their right to silence receive far less protection
from their Fifth Amendment rights than do suspects who invoke their
12
right to counsel. This differential treatment afforded by courts often
leads to decisions regarding the admissibility of statements that make no
sense and can lead to unjust results. Enhancing the impact of this
dubious distinction in cases such as Roberson and Minnick has made a
bad situation worse.
Recently, however, in a series of cases culminating in its 2010
13
decision, Maryland v. Shatzer, the Court paved the way for the
abolition of this unfairly differential treatment afforded to suspects who
invoke the right to silence. This has been achieved by decisions that
undercut the distinction in several ways. First, the Court clearly
identified and described the risk that is present when police seek to
reinterrogate a suspect after he invokes the rights protected by
14
Miranda.
The risk posed in such situations is that if the suspect
ultimately waives his Miranda rights, the waiver may be the product of
15
This danger exists regardless of
impermissible police badgering.
whether the suspect invoked his right to silence or his right to counsel.
Second, the Court treated other aspects of the invocation of the rights to
16
silence and counsel in the same manner,
leaving the impact on
reinterrogation of invoking one right as opposed to the other as the sole
difference between the two rights. Third, in Shatzer the Court
dispensed with the all or nothing approach it had taken regarding
17
invocation of the right to counsel.
Before Shatzer, when a suspect
invoked his right to counsel, he was apparently forever protected from
reinterrogation while in custody unless he initiated questioning or had
counsel present. Shatzer put a time limit on the duration of the Edwards
18
initiation protection. Thus, the Court closed the distance regarding
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010).
Id. at 1219–20.
Id. at 1220.
See infra Part V.C.
See infra Part V.C (discussing Shatzer).
See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1227 (concluding that a two week break between attempts
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permissible reinterrogation of suspects who invoke the right to silence
19
and those who invoke the right of counsel. It now makes more sense
than ever for the Court to adopt an approach to reinterrogation after
the invocation of the right to silence that precisely matches the one
applied to the invocation of the right to counsel. The reasoning used by
the Court in Shatzer regarding what is needed to prevent badgering
stemming from reinterrogation is the same regardless of which right the
suspect invokes. With such an approach, the police could seek to
reinterrogate a suspect in custody if he initiated the questioning, or after
the passage of fourteen days—during which the suspect had a break
from custody. In either case, as the police do now, they would first need
to rewarn the suspect of his rights and obtain a waiver of those rights.
Part II of this Article will demonstrate that the Supreme Court,
through its holdings in Mosley and Edwards, created the distinction for
permissible reinterrogation between suspects who invoke their right to
silence and those who invoke their right to counsel. It will argue that
the distinction is a flawed one that has no support in either the Fifth
Amendment or in the Court’s foundational holding in Miranda v.
20
Arizona. Part III will show that the approach taken in Edwards and
Mosley led to subsequent decisions that expand and stretch the
distinction and make a bad situation worse. Part IV will explore the
theoretical and pragmatic assumptions that undergird the Court’s
support of the idea that invocations of the right to silence and
invocations of the right to counsel should be treated differently. This
Part IV will also demonstrate that each of these assumptions is incorrect
and will offer a solution to the problem. The proposed solution would
remedy the unfairness created by the distinction and be consistent with
the Court’s recent approach to issues surrounding the protections
afforded by the Miranda decision.
II. THE SUPREME COURT CREATES THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
SILENCE AND COUNSEL
A. Miranda and the Fifth Amendment
21

In its landmark 1966 holding, Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme

to question terminated the Edwards protection).
19. Id. at 1227.
20. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); infra Part II.
21. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436.
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Court held that all suspects being interrogated while in custody must be
advised of their right to remain silent, that any statement they make can
be used against them, that they have the right to counsel, and that they
22
will be provided an attorney if they cannot afford one. In most ways,
the Miranda Court treated the rights to silence and counsel in the same
manner. Each right had to be given and each right had to be waived
23
before any interrogation could begin. Failure to obtain a waiver of
either right would prevent the prosecution from subsequently using the
24
suspect’s statement at his trial. Either right could be invoked even
after the suspect started to speak, and should the suspect invoke either
25
right, the questioning must stop immediately.
In fact, if any
significance is given to primacy, it is worth noting that the Miranda
Court’s first mention of a right to be afforded to suspects in custodial
interrogation was, “[a]t the outset . . . [that] he must first be
26
informed . . . that he has the right to remain silent.”
27
No right to counsel appears in the text of the Fifth Amendment.
The textual constitutional right to counsel in criminal cases stems from
28
the Sixth Amendment. The Court in Miranda, however, determined
that the only way to protect the right to be free from compulsory selfincrimination, a Fifth Amendment protection, is to afford the defendant
the right to counsel in what it held is a Fifth Amendment setting,
29
custodial interrogation. This Fifth Amendment right to counsel, unlike
the right to counsel in the Sixth Amendment, was not designed to
protect the defendant in the adversarial phase of a criminal
30
prosecution. Its purpose now, among other things, is to ensure the
protection of the right to silence during the inherently coercive

22. Id. at 444.
23. Id. at 479.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 473–75.
26. Id. at 467–68.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”).
29. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470.
30. James J. Tomkovicz, Standards for Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in Confession
Contexts, 71 IOWA L. REV. 975, 987 (1986) (“[T]he [S]ixth [A]mendment grants the assistance
of counsel only when the government has decided, as a general matter, to become an
adversary, and it extends that assistance only to instances of governmental conduct that pose
cognizable risks to the goal of adversarial equality.”).
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atmosphere that attends custodial interrogations.
Under the Fifth
Amendment, as interpreted by the Court in Miranda, the right to silence
is the basic right, and the right to counsel exists only to protect the right
32
to silence. This makes sense because the rights identified by the Court
in Miranda derive from the Fifth Amendment guarantee that no person
33
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself or herself. In other
34
words, the person can choose to remain silent. It was hardly surprising,
therefore, that the Miranda discussion of the rights to be afforded
35
suspects begins with the right to remain silent.
B. The Court Distinguishes the Rights to Silence and Counsel
In two cases, decided nine and fifteen years after Miranda, the Court
addressed whether a defendant who invokes his right to silence and one
36
who invokes his right to counsel can be reinterrogated while in custody.
37
The holdings in these two cases—Michigan v. Mosley and Edwards v.
38
Arizona —created substantially different protections regarding
39
reinterrogation of such suspects. It is important to understand why and
how the Court embarked on different paths when considering the
silence and counsel protections created by Miranda.
31. Id. at 989. Tomkovicz argues:
The origins of and rationale for Miranda counsel suggest a role different than that of
the sixth amendment assistant. In essence, Miranda counsel is a buffer against the
power of a state tempted to force incriminating statements from an unwilling
suspect. Fifth amendment counsel’s primary function, therefore, is to provide a
means and opportunity to prevent undue pressure to confess guilt. The promise of
legal assistance is intended to counter compulsion and ensure that information
surrendered is the product of an unfettered choice.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
32. Scott W. Howe, The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure: From Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REV. 359, 402 (2001);
Donald A. Dripps, Miranda After 25 Years: Alive and Well?, TRIAL, Mar. 1991, at 13.
33. Miranda, 348 U.S. at 479.
34. Id. at 469.
35. Id. at 467–68 (“At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to
interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right
to remain silent.”).
36. Under Miranda, a suspect can invoke either or both rights. See Miranda, 348 U.S. at
444–45.
37. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 106–07 (1975).
38. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981).
39. Mosley was the first Supreme Court decision to distinguish invocation of the right to
silence from the right to counsel. Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the
Interests of the Legal Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 453, 484 (2008).
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Mosley was arrested for his participation in a robbery. When given
his Miranda rights, Mosley said he did not wish to speak with the police,
41
and the detective immediately ceased questioning him. Two hours
later, another detective questioned Mosley in a different part of the
42
police station about an unrelated homicide case. Mosley was again
43
given his Miranda rights, but this time agreed to talk. The statement
he made to the second detective was introduced by the government at
44
his trial.
Mosley challenged the introduction of his statement, claiming his
invocation of the right to silence barred the police from reinterrogating
45
him. The Court held that such an invocation of the right to silence is
not eternal and that under certain conditions the suspect could be
46
reinterrogated while in custody. In the Mosley case, the Court found it
47
significant that the detective had “scrupulously honored” the
defendant’s right to silence by immediately cutting off questioning,
waiting a reasonable time before reinterrogating him, and providing the
48
defendant with a fresh set of Miranda warnings (which he waived).
The Court also seemed to find some significance in the fact that the
questioning was done by a different detective in a different location at
the police station and, also, that the questioning involved a different
case from the one in which the defendant had previously invoked his
49
right to silence.
40. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 97.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 97–98.
43. Id. at 98.
44. Id. at 99.
45. Id. at 98–99.
46. Id. at 102–03.
47. Id. at 103 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966)).
48. Id. at 104–05.
49. Id. These factors no longer appear to be important to an analysis under Mosley of
whether a defendant’s invocation of the right to silence was scrupulously honored. Instead,
subsequent cases have focused on the immediate cessation of questioning, waiting a
reasonable time before reinterrogation, and providing a fresh set of Miranda warnings. See,
e.g., Barton, supra note 39, at 483 (discussing how cases after Mosley have deemphasized
whether the reinterrogation after invocation of the right to silence deals with a different
crime).
It is interesting to note that although discussing invocation of the right to counsel, the
Court, in a recent opinion, made this observation about questioning in a different location by
a different law enforcement official:
Reinterrogation in different custody or by a different interrogating agency would
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In assessing whether a defendant who invokes his right to silence can
be reinterrogated, the Court appropriately looked to the holding in
Miranda for guidance. The passage in Miranda that addresses this issue
says:
If the individual indicates in any manner . . . that he wishes to
remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has
shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege;
any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot
be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.
Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody
interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice
in producing a statement after the privilege has been once
50
invoked.
The Mosley Court acknowledged that this passage “does not state under
51
what circumstances, if any, a resumption of questioning is permissible.”
It offered three possible literal interpretations of the passage. One
interpretation would mean the defendant could never be reinterrogated
52
once he invokes his right to silence.
A second would regard any
subsequent statement as involuntary no matter how voluntary it actually
53
was. The third would allow the police to reinterrogate after a short
54
stoppage of the interrogation. The Mosley Court found all of these
55
interpretations to be “absurd.” It said that the first two interpretations
would “transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational
obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity, and deprive suspects
of an opportunity to make informed and intelligent assessments of their
56
interests.”
The Court expressed concern that the third literal
interpretation could lead to the type of police badgering prohibited by

seem, if anything, less likely than termination of custody to reduce coercive
pressures. At the original site, and with respect to the original interrogating agency,
the suspect has already experienced cessation of interrogation when he demands
counsel—which he may have no reason to expect elsewhere.
Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1222 n.5 (2010). There is no reason why this observation
should not apply to reinterrogation after invocation of the right to silence as well.
50. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 100–01 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473–74 (1966)).
51. Id. at 101.
52. Id. at 101–02.
53. Id. at 102.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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57

Miranda. Thus, the Court held that questioning of a custodial suspect
who invokes the right to silence could be renewed once the safeguards
58
referred to above were honored. It is worth noting that, in dicta, both
59
60
the Mosley majority and the concurring opinion of Justice White
interpreted the language of Miranda speaking to what happens after a
defendant invokes his right to counsel to be significantly different than
what happens after a defendant invokes his right to silence. This
difference is what presaged the holding six years later in Edwards v.
61
Arizona.
62
In Edwards, Robert Edwards was arrested for robbery and murder.
After being given his Miranda rights and waiving them, Edwards made
63
an exculpatory statement. He then indicated he wished to have an
64
attorney to help him make a deal.
The questioning stopped at this
65
point. The next day, after a “guard told him that ‘he had’ to talk” to
the police, Edwards met with detectives and was again given his
66
Miranda rights.
He waived those rights and made a statement
67
The Supreme Court held that
inculpating himself in the crime.
Edwards’ inculpatory statement violated his Fifth Amendment right to
68
counsel identified in Miranda. The Court ruled that after a suspect
invokes his right to counsel during custodial interrogation, he cannot be
reinterrogated while in custody unless his attorney is present or he
69
initiates the questioning. The Edwards Court said that the issue was
decided by the language in Miranda that once a suspect invokes his right
70
to counsel, “the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.”
Apparently the Edwards Court, unlike the Court in Mosley, was not
troubled by applying what it considered to be a literal interpretation to
57. Id.
58. Id. at 104.
59. Id. at 104 n.10 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)).
60. Id. at 109–10 (White, J., concurring).
61. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981).
62. Id. at 478.
63. Id. at 479 (recounting that Edwards “denied involvement and gave a taped statement
presenting an alibi defense”).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 480.
69. Id. at 484–85.
70. Id. at 485 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)).
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the words of the Miranda holding prohibiting any custodial questioning
71
once a Miranda right is invoked. Unlike the Court in Mosley, the
Edwards Court seemed to have little concern for the “absurd” result
that would “transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational
obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity, and deprive suspects
of an opportunity to make informed and intelligent assessments of their
interests” due to the inability of the police to ever initiate a
72
reinterrogation of the defendant (unless counsel was present).
Another apparent change in concern from Mosley to Edwards is seen by
comparing the concurring opinion of Justice White in Mosley to his
majority opinion in Edwards. In his concurring opinion in Mosley,
Justice White had criticized the majority for seeming to impose a time
limit after invocation of the right to silence before questioning could
73
begin again.
To Justice White, all that mattered regarding the
admissibility of such a statement was whether the defendant’s waiver of
74
his rights was voluntary. For a court to suppress a statement when the
defendant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights, even if he
had previously invoked them, was “paternalistic” in Justice White’s

71. As one commentator wrote:
The Court has attempted to justify this distinction in several ways. First, it points to
the language in Miranda as supporting the difference between the treatment of the
right to silence and that of the right to counsel. That language, however, is at best
equivocal. The effect of the two rights is at times described interchangeably in
Miranda: when either is invoked, the police must “cease” the interrogation. In other
passages, the Court modified this by adding that when the right to counsel is
invoked, interrogation must cease “until an attorney is present.” But if the former
statement—that interrogation “must cease”—is not taken literally to mean that all
police-initiated interrogation must stop for all time and in all circumstances, why is
the latter viewed as absolute? In other words, why should the fact that the ending
point is specified—when counsel is present—be read to mean that event is the only
possible breaking point in Edwards? Unless we read into the passage that an
attorney being present is not only a sufficient condition for terminating Edwards
rights and permitting reinterrogation, but also a necessary one, there is no reason to
view the rights differently. Both could potentially be ended by myriad factors, as
the Court recognized in Mosley. In fact, the Court has held that the presence of
counsel is not a necessary condition for requestioning since a suspect’s initiation
allows the police to seek a valid waiver and commence interrogation even in the
absence of counsel.
Marcy Strauss, Reinterrogation, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 359, 384 (1995) (footnotes
omitted) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)).
72. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 (1975).
73. Id. at 110–11 (White, J., concurring).
74. See id. at 111.
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75

eyes. However, his majority opinion in Edwards seems to adopt the
very “paternalistic” approach he warned against in Mosley. This
difference in approaches is justified presumably because, by invoking his
right to counsel, “[the] accused has . . . expressed his desire to deal with
76
the police only through counsel.” When he invokes his right to silence,
however, apparently the suspect means only that he does not wish to
77
speak for an hour or two.
78
In Edwards, the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Burger and
79
Justice Powell would have limited the decision to the facts of the case,
most prominently that the police guard had told Edwards he had to talk
80
to the police. Burger and Powell both believed that a suspect has the
right to change his mind after an invocation of a Miranda right as long as
81
the waiver accompanying that change of mind is voluntary. While it
could be argued that once a right has been invoked a change of mind
can never be truly voluntary in the coercive environment of custodial
82
interrogation, it is hard to understand why a knowing waiver regarding
reinterrogation (without initiation by the suspect) can be voluntary after
an invocation of the right to silence but not after an invocation of the
83
right to counsel.
III. MAKING A BAD DISTINCTION WORSE
A. Extending the Edwards Protection to Interrogation about a Different
Case
Having created a substantial distinction between the power of the
police to reinterrogate a suspect who invoked his right to silence and
one who invoked his right to counsel, the Court then handed down a

75. Id. at 109.
76. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981).
77. See Barton, supra note 39, at 483; see also infra note 140 (citing cases where the
duration between the time of invocation and permissible reinterrogation was two hours or
less).
78. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 487–88 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
79. Id. at 489–92 (Powell, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 488 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 490 (Powell, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 488 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 490 (Powell, J., concurring).
82. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 100–02 (1975) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 473–74 (1966)).
83. Nelson G. Wolff, Note, Minnick v. Mississippi: The Supreme Court Reinforces a
Suspect’s Right to Have Counsel Present During Custodial Interrogation, 56 MO. L. REV. 1157,
1180 (1991); Dripps, supra note 32, at 16.
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number of decisions that both expanded and stretched this distinction.
84
In Arizona v. Roberson, the Court held that once a suspect invokes his
right to counsel during custodial interrogation, he cannot be
reinterrogated about any crime (including the crime for which he was
arrested), unless he initiates the questioning or he has his attorney
85
present during the questioning.
The reinterrogation in Roberson
occurred three days after Roberson’s invocation of his right to counsel;
whereas, Mosley was reinterrogated only two hours after his invocation
86
of the right to silence. Moreover, in concluding that Mosley’s right to
silence was “fully respected” after his invocation of the right, the Court
found it significant that the questioning involved “a crime different in
nature and in time and place of occurrence” from the crimes for which
87
Mosley originally invoked the right. However, the fact that Roberson’s
reinterrogation involved a crime also different in time and location from
the original one for which he invoked his right to counsel seemed
88
unimportant to the Roberson Court. Instead, the Court focused on the
idea that the bright-line rule of Edwards should not be disregarded
merely because the suspect, while still in custody, was being interrogated
about a crime different than the one for which he invoked his right to
89
counsel.
Taken together then, the Court’s holdings in Mosley, Edwards, and
Roberson maintain the seeming anomaly that a defendant who invokes
his right to silence is not being badgered when police reinterrogate him
two hours later about a different crime, while one who invokes his right
to counsel is being badgered when reinterrogated the next day—or three
days later—even if, the reinterrogation concerns a different crime. The
Court in Roberson put no time limit on the duration of this notion of
badgering regarding reinterrogation after invocation of the right to
90
counsel. So, presumably, a defendant who is interrogated years after
his invocation of the right to counsel in one case cannot be interrogated

84. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
85. Id. at 686–87.
86. Id. at 678; Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104.
87. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104–05.
88. See Roberson, 486 U.S. at 687–88 (noting that the need to determine whether the
suspect has requested counsel exists regardless of whether reinterrogation concerns the same
or a different offense, or whether the same or different law enforcement authorities are
involved in the second investigation).
89. Id.
90. See Roberson, 486 U.S. at 677–78.
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about another case while in custody, even as to a totally different crime.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals applied this very reasoning
in suppressing a statement made five months after the defendant’s
91
invocation of the right to counsel. In fact, in United States v. Green, the
defendant had already pled guilty in the drug case in which he had
invoked his right to counsel before making a statement in a totally
92
unconnected murder case five months later. The appellate court held
93
this would still be regarded as badgering under Edwards.
It is
important, therefore, to see the justification the Court provides in
Roberson for taking such a position.
According to the Court in Roberson, when a defendant invokes his
right to counsel in custodial interrogation, he is expressing the belief
that he is “not capable of undergoing such questioning without advice of
94
counsel,” and he is “not competent to deal with the authorities without
95
legal advice.” The Roberson Court also exalted the benefits to law
enforcement and the courts of providing a “bright-line rule” that
provides “‘clear and unequivocal’ guidelines” of what action can and
96
cannot be taken after a defendant invokes his right to counsel. In fact,
the benefits of a specific bright-line rule are so important, both to the
government and the defendant, that they outweigh the consequences of
the inability to present to the fact-finder what the Court called “highly
probative evidence” of an otherwise voluntary statement by the
97
accused. Apparently, the benefits of such a bright-line rule are not
relevant to what the government may do after a defendant invokes his
right to silence as a defendant may be reinterrogated after a “reasonable
98
time” during which his rights are scrupulously honored.
91. United States v. Green, 592 A.2d 985, 989–90 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 504 U.S.
908 (1992), vacated as moot, 507 U.S. 545 (1993). The Court granted certiorari, but when the
defendant died, the appeal was vacated as moot. Green, 507 U.S. at 545.
92. Id. at 985–86.
93. Id. at 989.
94. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 681.
95. Id. at 681 (adopting Justice White’s concurring view from Michigan v. Mosley, 423
U.S. 96, 110 n.2 (1975)).
96. Id. at 681–82.
97. Id. at (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979)).
98. For a discussion of “reasonable time” see infra note 140 and accompanying text.
What constitutes the scrupulous honoring of a suspect’s rights after he invokes his Miranda
right to remain silent is far from a bright line. As Justice Sotomayor wrote recently, “as we
have previously recognized, Mosley itself does not offer clear guidance to police about when
and how interrogation may continue after a suspect invokes his rights.” Berghuis v.
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2276 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also infra note 355
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In Roberson, the government argued that the issue was similar to
that which confronted the Court the previous year in Connecticut v.
99
Barrett. In Barrett, the defendant, after being given his Miranda rights
while in custody, indicated he would speak to the police but would not
100
give a written statement without counsel. The Barrett Court held that
the defendant’s oral statement was admissible because he had the right
101
Similarly, in
to make a limited waiver of his right to counsel.
Roberson, the government argued that the defendant made a limited
waiver—one that was limited only to questioning involving the drug
102
case. However, the Court held that, as a matter of fact, the case was
distinguishable from Barrett because Roberson said he “wanted a lawyer
103
before answering any questions.”
The Court went on to hold that
104
Roberson was also distinguishable as a matter of law. Implicitly then,
even if Roberson had said he wanted counsel just for the drug case, the
police still would be barred from initiating questioning about the murder
case because that too would be seen as yielding to the pressure of the
custodial setting.
This suggests that, a defendant can still be
reinterrogated after his unconditional statement that he wants to remain
silent, but a defendant who imposes at least some conditions on the
exercise of his right to counsel cannot be reinterrogated—even if those
conditions are met by the police. To avoid such an anomaly, the
invocation of either right should be treated in the same manner.
The other reason the Court offered in support of its decision in
Roberson regarding invocation of the right to counsel also invites
application to invocation of the right to silence. The Court rejected the
government’s argument that a fresh set of Miranda warnings before the
reinterrogation of the defendant after he had previously invoked his
right to counsel would “‘reassure’ a suspect . . . that his rights have
105
remained untrammeled.”
It reasoned that the defendant had been
(setting forth cases showing inconsistency regarding the application of the Mosley factors).
99. See Roberson, 486 U.S. at 683; Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987).
100. Barrett, 479 U.S. at 525.
101. Id. at 529.
102. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 683.
103. Id.
104. Id. (“As a matter of law, the presumption raised by a suspect’s request for
counsel—that he considers himself unable to deal with the pressures of custodial
interrogation without legal assistance—does not disappear simply because the police have
approached the suspect, still in custody, still without counsel, about a separate
investigation.”).
105. Id. at 686.
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denied his request for counsel for three days, hardly an environment
106
designed to reassure him that his rights were being honored.
While
107
this reason seems to apply primarily to invocation of the counsel, what
the Court said immediately after should apply to invocation of the right
to silence as well. The Court wrote, “[T]here is a serious risk that the
mere repetition of the Miranda warnings would not overcome the
108
presumption of coercion that is created by prolonged police custody.”
In Mosley, however, the Court held that the repetition of Miranda
warnings even after prolonged custody—apparently the more prolonged
109
the better to prevent badgering —plays a role in ensuring that the
reinterrogation of a defendant after he invokes his right to silence is not
110
coercive.
B. Applying the Edwards Protection even After the Suspect is Permitted
to Consult with Counsel
Now fully invested in the distinction it created between
reinterrogation of the suspect who invokes his right to counsel and the
suspect who invokes his right to silence, the Court went all-in with its
111
decision in Minnick v. Mississippi.
In Minnick, the Court held—
notwithstanding the fact that after requesting counsel the police allowed
Minnick to speak with his lawyer on two or three occasions—that the
112
subsequent statement was still not compliant with Edwards.
The facts of Minnick are interesting because, unlike those of
Edwards and Roberson, they seem to demonstrate a situation in which

106. Id.
107. See id. One could argue, however, that any police attempt to reinterrogate a
suspect in custody who has previously insisted on her right to remain silent is hardly designed
to assure the suspect that her rights are being honored either.
108. Id. at 686 (footnote omitted).
109. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 (1975). This is because in Mosley, the
Court held that the longer the period of time between when the suspect invokes his right to
silence and when the police attempt to reinterrogate him, the more the suspect’s rights were
scrupulously honored. See id. However, it is arguable that the longer the time the suspect
remains in police custody, isolated from friends and family, the more susceptible he will be to
having his resistance to speaking with the police worn down. Christopher S. Thrutchley,
Minnick v. Mississippi: Rationale of Right to Counsel Necessitates Reversal of Michigan v.
Mosley’s Right to Silence Ruling, 27 TULSA L.J. 181, 197–98 (1991); see also Strauss, supra
note 71, at 401 (discussing how in the right to counsel context, a longer period of custody may
increase the coercion on the suspect).
110. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 105–06.
111. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
112. Id. at 149–50.
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the police affirmatively honored the defendant’s request for counsel.
After making certain admissions regarding a murder case, Minnick told
the FBI interrogators to “[c]ome back Monday when I have a lawyer”
and that he “would make a more complete statement then with his
113
lawyer present.” A lawyer was appointed for Minnick, and he spoke
114
with the lawyer on several occasions. On the Monday referred to by
Minnick above, three days after the invocation of his right to counsel, a
115
local sheriff questioned Minnick and obtained a confession. Minnick
challenged the admission of this latter confession, claiming his right to
be free from police-initiated reinterrogation after invocation of his right
116
to counsel had been violated. The Court ruled in his favor, concluding
that even speaking with counsel does not free the government of the
117
requirement that counsel be present during such reinterrogations.
As it did with the language of Miranda in Mosley and Edwards, the
Court in Minnick made an interesting choice of which words from
previous opinions to take literally and which to view more expansively.
At the outset of its opinion in Minnick, the Court referred to the
holding in Edwards, which stated that after an invocation of the right to
counsel, police may not initiate reinterrogation of the suspect “until
118
counsel has been made available to him.” Counsel had not only been
“made available” to Minnick, but Minnick exercised this right by
119
speaking with his lawyer on two or three occasions.
According to
120
The
Mississippi’s highest court, Edwards had been complied with.
Supreme Court, however, interpreted language it had written both
before and after Edwards as indicating that the language cited above
from Edwards apparently did not mean what it said. It selectively
quoted from Miranda’s prohibition on reinterrogating a suspect who has
121
invoked his right to counsel “until an attorney is present,” selective,
because the Court neglected to point out that two paragraphs later, the
Miranda Court stated, “If the interrogation continues without . . . an
attorney[,] . . . a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 148–49.
Id. at 149.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 149–50 (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981)).
See id.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 152 (emphasis added) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)).
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that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege
against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed
122
counsel.”
Thus, rather than prohibiting reinterrogation without an
attorney, the Miranda Court envisioned the possibility of
reinterrogation of a defendant who invokes his right to counsel but
required the government to meet a heavy burden in showing his change
123
of mind was valid.
The Minnick Court then quoted from three of its post-Edwards
opinions in which the Court had referred to the protection of Edwards
as existing unless counsel is present during reinterrogation following
124
invocation of the right to counsel.
In none of those three cases,
however, had counsel been appointed for the defendants nor had they
125
consulted with counsel, as had happened in Minnick.
In fact, those
three cases had nothing to do with the issue of whether consulting with
counsel satisfied the Edwards requirement, so it is questionable whether
the Court’s description of that aspect of the previous holdings should be
126
used to negate the clear language of Edwards.
Still, the Court
conceded that until its decision in Minnick, there were “ambiguities” on
127
this point in its previous decisions.
Given these ambiguities, the
Minnick Court rightly looked to the pragmatic meaning of the Edwards
protection to determine if its requirement protecting suspects was
128
honored in this case.
The first evidence that the Miranda protection was violated in this
case, according to the Court, was that Minnick testified that, although he
resisted, his jailers told him not once, but twice, that he had to speak to
129
the government interrogators.
If the defendant’s testimony was
122. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n.14 (1964)).
123. See id.
124. Minnick, 498 U.S. at 152–53.
125. Id. at 149, 152–53 (citing Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 680 (1988); Shea v.
Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 52 (1985); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1043 (1983)). The
significance of Minnick’s having actually conferred with his counsel should be to “reinforce
the suspect” in his decision not to speak and therefore make the risk of coercion no greater
for Minnick than for a suspect who invokes his right to remain silent. Dripps, supra note 32,
at 16.
126. Minnick, 498 U.S. at 161–62 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the purpose of the
Edwards protection is to ensure that the defendant can consult with his attorney and
therefore be aware of his rights after requesting counsel as he did here).
127. Id. at 153 (majority opinion).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 148–49. On two different occasions, Minnick was told that he would “have to
go down [to the interview] or else” and that he would “have to talk” to law enforcement
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deemed credible and it was combined with Minnick’s refusal to sign a
waiver form, it could have formed the basis for an opinion that
Minnick’s confession violated Miranda without having to stretch the
Edwards language to get there. Instead, the Court said this was an
example of why mere consultation with counsel was inadequate to
130
protect defendants who had previously invoked their right to counsel.
The Court speculated that the actions above might show that Minnick
was confused about the admissibility of any statements he would make
to the police, and the presence of counsel during questioning could have
131
clarified any such confusion. A far more likely scenario would be that
during the several conversations Minnick had with his attorney after
invoking his right to counsel, his attorney informed him quite
132
definitively of his right not to answer any questions.
In fact, any
attorney not offering such advice in Minnick’s situation would be
133
incompetent.
Thus, Minnick likely received the type of protection,
from counsel, envisioned in Edwards.
The Court found additional justification for its holding in Minnick
from the need to keep application of the Edwards protection “clear and
134
unequivocal.” In this regard, the Court noted that even if the Edwards
protection was satisfied by the kinds of consultation with counsel that
occurred here, it was undisputed that the protection would arise anew
135
should the defendant again invoke his right to counsel. According to
the Court, this would cause the Edwards protection to “pass in and out
136
of existence multiple times.” The Court then asserted that “[v]agaries
of this sort spread confusion through the justice system and lead to a

officials. Id.
130. Id. at 153–54.
131. Id. at 154.
132. Id. at 157 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Joint App. at 46–47, Minnick v. Mississippi,
498 U.S. 196 (1990)) (noting that, in fact, Minnick testified that his attorney did advise him
“to not talk to nobody and not tell nobody nothing and to not sign no waivers”).
133. Id. at 162. In the words of one commentator, “[a]s the Court has repeatedly noted
‘any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to
police under any circumstances.’” Barton, supra note 39, at 487 (quoting Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478, 488 (1964); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
Barton also noted that “the very first thing any lawyer summoned to a police station by a
Miranda request will do is find out what the client has already said and strongly advise the
client to say nothing further.” Barton, supra note 39, at 487.
134. Minnick, 498 U.S. at 154–55.
135. Id. at 154.
136. Id.
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consequent loss of respect for the underlying constitutional principle.”
This assertion by the Court is well taken and begs the question of
why the same principle is not applied when the defendant invokes his
right to silence. Although Mosley made clear that such defendants can
be reinterrogated if their right to silence is scrupulously honored, it is
also undisputed that at any time during the reinterrogation the
defendant could again invoke his right to silence and the questioning
138
would have to cease. This would lead to precisely the same situation
139
The Mosley protection in
criticized so severely by the Court above.
such a situation could pass in and out of existence multiple times. Take
a situation in which a defendant in a custodial interrogation
environment invokes his right to silence. The police scrupulously honor
the right by immediately ceasing their questioning, waiting a reasonable
140
time (itself a vague standard)
and issuing a fresh set of Miranda
warnings. The police then reinterrogate the defendant as permitted
under Mosley. The defendant begins responding and again asserts his
141
right to silence. Once again, the police must honor the invocation but
can adhere to the Mosley requirements and come back yet again to
reinterrogate the defendant. This would lead the Mosley protection to
142
“pass in and out of existence multiple times” and warrants the same
type of criticism from a consistent Supreme Court.
The Court in Minnick reasoned that the confusion it described above
143
is heightened by the imprecise meaning of consultation. One example
it offered related to the length of time the consultation would have to be
144
in order to satisfy the standard that the government proposed. Would
145
a “hurried interchange” between counsel and client be deemed

137. Id. at 155.
138. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 106–07 (1975).
139. See supra notes 134–37 and accompanying text.
140. See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 106–07; see also Robinson v. Attorney Gen. of Kan., 28
F.App’x. 849, 853 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that a break of one hour between the invocation
of the right to silence and the subsequent interrogation was sufficient); United States v.
Thompson, 866 F.2d 268, 271–72 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that a break of thirty minutes was a
reasonable period of time, after which law enforcement officers could reinterrogate the
defendant); United States v. Udey, 748 F.2d 1231, 1242 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that six hours
was a reasonable period of time under Mosley).
141. See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 106–07.
142. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 154–55 (1990).
143. Id. at 155.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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sufficient or would there have to be a “lengthy in-person conference”?
Again, this is a fair question, and again the parallel to a Mosley situation
is inescapable. How much time must pass after invocation of the right to
silence before the police may come back and reinterrogate the
defendant while still being said to have “scrupulously” observed his
147
right? In Mosley that time period was two hours. In subsequent cases,
time periods as short as ten or thirty minutes have been found to be
148
acceptable.
How many times may the police come back after the
149
Tje
defendant’s assertion and reassertion of his right to silence?
confusion and ambiguities identified by the Court regarding the
Edwards standard of sufficiency of consultation with counsel are also
present in the Mosley standard of sufficiency of invocation of the right
to silence.
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Minnick takes the position that there is no
significant distinction, either constitutional or practical, between the
protection the defendant receives from consultation with counsel and
150
having counsel present during the reinterrogation. Because Scalia has
151
been a harsh critic of the holdings in Edwards and even Miranda, it is
146. Id.
147. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975).
148. See United States v. Thompson, 866 F.2d 268, 271–72 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding
defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights were not violated when law enforcement officer
resumed questioning approximately thirty minutes after defendant had invoked his right to
remain silent); United States v. Hsu, 852 F.2d 407, 411–12 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding same);
Lanosa v. Frank, No. 07-00115, 2007 WL 2746839, at *7 (D. Haw. Sept. 17, 2007) (holding
police attempt to reinterrogate the defendant ten minutes after he had invoked his right to
silence did not violate Fifth Amendment), aff’d, 304 F.App’x. 565, 566 (9th Cir. 2008); Stock
v. Alaska, 191 P.3d 153, 155–56, 161 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008) (holding defendant’s Fifth
Amendment rights were not violated when law enforcement officer resumed questioning
approximately thirty minutes after defendant had invoked his right to remain silent).
149. See, e.g., infra notes 223–35 (discussing Grant v. Warden, 616 F.3d 72 (1st Cir.
2010), cert. denied sub nom. Grant v. Barnhart, 131 S. Ct. 948 (2011)).
150. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 161–62 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 448 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(referring to the Miranda decision as “objectionable” and “preposterous”); Minnick, 498 U.S.
at 165 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Minnick, Justice Scalia stated:
The Edwards rule is premised on an (already tenuous) assumption about the
suspect’s psychological state, and when the event of consultation renders that
assumption invalid the rule should no longer apply. One searching for ironies in the
state of our law should consider, first, the irony created by Edwards itself: The
suspect in custody who says categorically “I do not wish to discuss this matter” can
be asked to change his mind; but if he should say, more tentatively, “I do not think I
should discuss this matter without my attorney present” he can no longer be
approached. . . . Today’s extension of the Edwards prohibition is the latest stage of
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noteworthy to see Scalia’s agreement with Yale Kamisar—a staunch
defender of Miranda—when it comes to the distinction between
152
application of the right to silence and the right to counsel.
In his
dissent in Minnick, Justice Scalia writes:
Drawing a distinction between police-initiated inquiry before
consultation with counsel and police-initiated inquiry after
consultation with counsel is assuredly more reasonable than
other distinctions Edwards has already led us into—such as the
distinction between police-initiated inquiry after assertion of the
Miranda right to remain silent, and police-initiated inquiry after
153
assertion of the Miranda right to counsel.
C. What the Court Giveth on One Hand
While, on one hand, the Court created and strengthened the
protection defendants receive once they have invoked the right to
counsel during custodial interrogation, on the other hand, the Court
made it difficult for defendants to take advantage of the Edwards
154
155
protection. In both Oregon v. Bradshaw and Davis v. United States,
the Court set up significant barriers to defendants seeking to suppress
156
statements they claimed resulted from violations of Edwards. Both of
these five-person majority opinions drew strong opposition from four
157
Justices on the Court and substantial criticism from commentators.
prophylaxis built upon prophylaxis, producing a veritable fairyland castle of
imagined constitutional restriction upon law enforcement. This newest tower,
according to the Court, is needed to avoid “inconsisten[cy] with [the] purpose” of
Edwards’ prophylactic rule . . . which was needed to protect Miranda’s prophylactic
right to have counsel present, which was needed to protect the right against
compelled self-incrimination found (at last!) in the Constitution.
Id. at 165–66 (quoting id. at 154 (majority opinion)).
152. Minnick, 498 U.S. at 164 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (offering Yale Kamisar’s statement
that “either Mosley was wrongly decided or Edwards was” (quoting Yale Kamisar, The
Edwards and Bradshaw Cases: The Court Giveth and the Court Taketh Away, in 5 SUPREME
COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 153, 157 (J. Choper et al. eds. 1984))).
153. Minnick, 498 U.S. at 164 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
154. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983).
155. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
156. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); Davis, 512 U.S. at 459; Bradshaw, 462
U.S. at 1045–46.
157. See, e.g., Jane M. Faulkner, Note, So You Kinda, Sorta, Think You Might Need a
Lawyer?: Ambiguous Requests for Counsel After Davis v. United States, 49 ARK. L. REV. 275,
277–78 (1996) (concluding that the Davis decision left open the issue of ambiguity and will
result in a flood of litigation focusing on the exact language and actions a defendant must use
to invoke the right to counsel); Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Love–Hate Relationship
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After police gave Bradshaw his Miranda rights in connection with
the investigation of a homicide, Bradshaw denied active involvement in
158
the crime and then invoked his right to counsel. As he was about to be
transported from the police station to the local jail, Bradshaw asked a
159
police officer, “Well, what is going to happen to me now?”
After
some further discussion between the two, Bradshaw agreed to take a
160
Upon being told that he had failed the polygraph,
polygraph.
161
Bradshaw made an inculpatory statement.
Bradshaw challenged the
admission of that statement, claiming it was elicited in violation of his
162
right to counsel as enumerated in Miranda and Edwards.
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Bradshaw’s
comment to the officer inquiring what would happen to him constituted
an initiation and, therefore, allowed the police to interrogate him under
163
Edwards.
The Oregon Court of Appeals held that Bradshaw’s
comment—which came only minutes after he asked for an attorney—
was “a normal reaction to being taken from the police station and
164
placed in a police car, obviously for transport to some destination.” In
other words, Bradshaw wanted to know where he was headed and had
with Miranda, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 375, 430 (2011) (“Bradshaw’s support for the
notion that Miranda created three classifications of suspects cannot be reconciled with
Thompkins’s concept of pre-waiver interrogation.”); Allen F. Loucks, Initiation: The
Emperor’s New Test, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 608, 609 (1985) (“Adoption of the Bradshaw
plurality’s reasoning by a majority of the Court would overrule Edwards sub silentio and
present the spectacle, perhaps unique in the law of criminal procedure, of the Court creating
rights devoid of substance.”); Marcy Strauss, The Sounds of Silence: Reconsidering the
Invocation of the Right to Remain Silent Under Miranda, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 773,
775, 794 (2009) (criticizing Davis and arguing “[j]udges have gone to extraordinary lengths to
classify even seemingly clear invocations as ambiguous invocations which can be ignored by
the police.”); Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1588
(2008) (arguing that Davis undermines the assumption in Miranda that questioning will only
take place with suspects who have decided they are willing to speak, or that suspects can
easily stop questioning once it has started).
158. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1041–42.
159. Id. at 1042.
160. Id.
161. Id. Bradshaw recanted his earlier story and admitted that he had been driving the
vehicle in which the victim was killed, that he had consumed a considerable amount of
alcohol, and that he had passed out while driving. Id.
162. Id. at 1042–43. Bradshaw’s motion to suppress the statement was denied during a
bench trial, but the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statements had been
obtained in violation of Bradshaw’s Fifth Amendment rights, and relying on the decision in
Edwards. Id.
163. Id. at 1041.
164. State v. Bradshaw, 636 P.2d 1011, 1013 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
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not intended to initiate a discussion, even generally, about his
involvement in the crime. The Supreme Court, in overturning the
opinion of the Oregon Court of Appeals, held that Bradshaw’s comment
“evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about
the investigation,” and therefore, constituted an initiation under
165
Edwards.
Speaking for the four Justices in dissent, Justice Marshall took no
issue with the majority’s definition of initiation, but thought it extremely
unlikely that Bradshaw was looking to initiate such a discussion of his
166
crime. Marshall wrote,
If respondent’s question had been posed by Jean-Paul Sartre
before a class of philosophy students, it might well have evinced
a desire for a “generalized” discussion.
But under the
circumstances of this case, it is plain that respondent’s only
“desire” was to find out where the police were going to take
167
him.
Justice Marshall then noted that custody deprives one of control over
his surroundings, so it is especially likely that a question—such as the
one posed by Bradshaw—would relate to the immediate change of those
168
surroundings.
It is interesting to note that in rendering its decision that Bradshaw’s
question to the officer constituted an initiation under Edwards, the
169
Court conceded that the question itself was ambiguous. Apparently,
the Court chose not to interpret this ambiguity in favor of the
170
defendant.
In terms of interpreting ambiguity against the defendant
when it comes to gaining access to the protections of Edwards, however,
it is the Court’s opinion in Davis v. United States that is most
noteworthy.
In Davis, naval investigators took Davis into custody and gave him

165. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045–46.
166. Id. at 1055 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1056 (noting that “[t]he very essence of custody is the loss of control over
one’s freedom of movement” and that Bradshaw’s question was a natural response to his
being in custody).
169. Id. at 1045–46 (majority opinion).
170. Id. (“Although ambiguous, the respondent’s question in this case as to what was
going to happen to him evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about
the investigation; it was not merely a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the
custodial relationship.”).
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the military equivalent of his Miranda rights, after which he agreed to
171
talk to the officers. Ninety minutes into the questioning, Davis said,
172
“Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.” The investigators then attempted
173
to clarify whether Davis was invoking his right to counsel. They told
Davis that if he wanted a lawyer they would stop the questioning and
not continue unless they could clarify whether he was invoking his
174
175
right.
At that point, Davis said he did not want a lawyer.
The
officers then took a short break and re-advised the defendant of both his
right to remain silent and right to counsel before questioning him
176
again.
Davis later argued that all statements he made after what he
claimed was an invocation of his right to counsel should be suppressed
177
under Edwards.
The U.S. Court of Military Appeals denied the
defendant’s appeal, holding that the naval investigators did what they
178
should have in the face of an ambiguous request for counsel.
The
investigators asked narrow questions designed to clarify whether Davis’s
179
statement was an invocation of the right to counsel.
In assessing whether suspects’ words in custodial interrogation
environments constituted invocation of the right to counsel and thereby
engaged the protection of Edwards, the Court took an all-or-nothing
approach. The Court held that only an unambiguous request for an
180
attorney invoked the protections of Edwards.
Thus, the police need
not stop questioning such a suspect because he might have requested
counsel, rather the police must stop only if he actually makes such a
181
request. Numerous commentators have observed that those who are
171. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 454 (1994) (“As required by military law, the
agents advised [Davis] that he was a suspect in the killing, that he was not required to make a
statement, that any statement could be used against him at a trial by court-martial, and that
he was entitled to speak with an attorney and have an attorney present during questioning.”).
172. Id. at 455.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. United States v. Davis, 36 M.J. 337, 341 (C.M.A. 1993), aff’d, Davis, 512 U.S. at 459.
179. Davis, 36 M.J. at 342.
180. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. But, as one commentator observed, “[F]ailure to accord
invocation status to any but the clearest claims to counsel seems equally misguided. Too
strict a standard would probably exclude many instances of conduct meant to be counsel
assertions and, consequently, would risk constitutional losses in many cases that merit
heightened protection.” Tomkovicz, supra note 30, at 1011.
181. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459.
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young, inexperienced with the criminal justice system, less educated, or
inarticulate are severely disadvantaged by requiring that invocation of
182
the right to counsel be unambiguous. When such people are under the
extreme pressures that attend custodial interrogation, it is even less
likely that requests for counsel will be expressed with absolute
183
certainty. The Court anticipated such criticism by conceding that such
suspects may genuinely want counsel but may not express their desires
with sufficient clarity to require ending the interrogation, after this
184
decision. The Court’s response to this was twofold. First, it said that
the Miranda warnings themselves provide the primary means of assuring
that any statement of the defendant is not violative of his rights, and that
to avail themselves of the extra protection of Edwards, the defendant
185
has to assert that right unambiguously.
Second, the Court reasoned
that allowing an ambiguous request for counsel to trigger the protection
of Edwards would take away from the “clarity and ease of application”
186
that the bright-line Edwards rule created.
Stating that the warnings themselves are the primary protection for
suspects facing custodial interrogation hardly responds to the assertion
that it is profoundly unfair to take advantage of a suspect who may want
to assert her right to counsel but whose lack of education, language
skills, or some other impediment makes him or her unlikely to do so
with the definitiveness required by the Court in Davis. As to the
182. See, e.g., Richard Rogers et. al., “Everyone Knows Their Miranda Rights”: Implicit
Assumptions and Countervailing Evidence, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 300, 306–07 (2010)
(noting that in a study of 149 previously arrested defendants, 69.1% of defendants stated that
they believed that “I want a lawyer” meant the same thing as saying “I might want a lawyer”);
Marcy Strauss, Understanding Davis v. United States, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1011, 1012 (2006)
(concluding that Davis will eviscerate the Miranda guarantees, particularly for women and
minorities who tend not to speak in clear, declarative terms); Weisselberg, supra note 157, at
1570 (noting that mentally disabled subjects in a study understood only about 20% of the
critical words comprising the Miranda vocabulary and that their ability to understand the
Miranda warnings was likewise severely impaired).
183. In this regard, one commentator wrote:
Equivocal assertions often indicate some susceptibility to the pressure of custodial
interrogation or some interest in securing an advocate. An approach that demands
clarity and ignores anything less would deprive individuals of the adequate
opportunities for decisions that are essential to Miranda and Massiah protections.
Such treatment of potential invocations could undermine Miranda’s goal of
dissipating compulsion by permitting refuge in counsel.
Tomkovicz, supra note 30, at 1012.
184. Davis, 512 U.S. at 460.
185. Id. at 460–61.
186. Id. at 461.
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Court’s second response, cases subsequent to Davis show that the
approach the Davis Court adopted hardly created clarity or ease of
application with respect to whether a suspect is invoking the right to
187
counsel.
Whatever one thinks of the Court’s conclusion about the significance
of a suspect’s unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel, it is far
harder to justify the Court’s cursory response to the requirements of
police once a defendant makes an ambiguous request for counsel. In
Davis, the investigators stopped questioning about the crime until they
188
clarified Davis’s ambiguous request. Only after they reminded Davis
that if he wanted an attorney they would stop the questioning and Davis
replied affirmatively that he did not want a lawyer did the investigators
189
continue questioning him.
It was the investigators’ clarification of
Davis’s initial request for counsel that led the United States Court of
Military Appeals to affirm the denial of Davis’s motion to suppress his
190
statement.
While referring to this clarification of an ambiguous

187. Compare, e.g., Lord v. Duckworth, 29 F.3d 1216, 1220–21 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding
that defendant’s statement during questioning that “I can’t afford a lawyer but is there
anyway I can get one?” was not a “clear request” for counsel which would have required
immediate cessation of questioning), and Kapocsi v. Oklahoma, 668 P.2d 1157, 1159–60
(Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (holding that the statement “I’m thinking I will need a lawyer” was
not a request for counsel), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1070 (1984), Clausen v. Texas, 682 S.W.2d
328, 330–31 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that appellant’s statement to interrogating officer
that he was trying to contact an attorney was not an invocation of the right to counsel), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1021 (1986), with Abela v. Martin, 380 F.3d 915, 926 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding
that defendant’s statement, “maybe I should talk to an attorney by the name of William
Evans” was sufficient to invoke his right to counsel), United States v. Alamilla-Hernandez,
654 F.Supp. 2d 1004, 1010 (D. Neb. 2009) (holding that the defendant’s statement “I cannot
afford an attorney” was a clear invocation of his right to counsel), and McDaniel v. Virginia,
506 S.E.2d 21, 23 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (holding “I think I would rather have an attorney here
to speak for me,” was an unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel), aff’d en banc, 518
S.E.2d 851, 853 (Va. App. 1999).
188. Davis, 512 U.S. at 455. After Davis stated “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer[,]” the
interview then proceeded as follows:
[We] made it very clear that we’re not here to violate his rights, that if he wants a
lawyer, then we will stop any kind of questioning with him, that we weren’t going to
pursue the matter unless we have it clarified is he asking for a lawyer or is he just
making a comment about a lawyer, and he said, “No, I’m not asking for a lawyer,”
and then he continued on, and said, “No, I don’t want a lawyer,” and then he said he
didn’t kill the guy and he said that he was the type of person that if he did kill the
guy, he’d have to tell someone about it.
United States v. Davis, 36 M.J. 337, 339–40 (C.M.A. 1993).
189. Davis, 36 M.J. at 340.
190. Id. at 341.
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request for counsel by the investigators as “good police practice,” the
191
Supreme Court held that such a clarification is unnecessary.
The
Court gave no reason for this other than there was no requirement for
192
such a clarification. In other words, when a suspect in custody says, “I
might want an attorney” or something similar, the police may
193
completely ignore these words and continue with their questioning.
The failure of the Court in Davis to require the “good police
practice”—of clarifying an ambiguous request for counsel—before the
police may resume questioning a suspect in custody is, as Justice Souter
194
said in his concurring opinion, unfair as well as unwise.
While the
reason why the Court would render such a harsh decision can never be
totally known, it is worth observing that the Court chose to refer, as it
195
had in previous cases, to the ‘“rigid’ prophylactic rule of Edwards.”
Whether the Court would have rendered a decision like the one in Davis
had it not embarked on the path it had begun with Edwards and
continued with Roberson and Minnick toward what it came to regard as
a “rigid prophylactic rule” is, of course, speculation. It is fair to ask,
however, if faced with the extreme reach of the Edwards protections,
the Court in Bradshaw and Davis was determined to make it difficult for
196
defendants to grasp onto such extensive protections.
One
commentator noted the effect of Edwards and its progeny by saying:
[T]he breathtaking scope of the Edwards presumption, extending
191. Davis, 512 U.S. at 461.
192. Id.
193. Commenting on such a situation, Professor James Tomkovicz wrote that, “an
approach that allows agents to disregard completely every unclear assertion seems both
unnecessarily rigid and oblivious to the reality that decision making is not always an
instantaneous, all-or-nothing process.” Tomkovicz, supra note 30, at 1011–12.
194. Davis, 512 U.S. at 467 (Souter, J., concurring).
195. Id. at 458 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (quoting Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S.
91, 95 (1984); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979)).
196. While Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 (1983), was decided before the
Court’s decisions in Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988), and Minnick v. Mississippi, 498
U.S. 146 (1990), it still followed creation of the special initiation protection in Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981), and the characterization of it as rigid in Fare, 442 U.S.
707, 718 (1979). Davis, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) was handed down after the Court expanded the
Edwards protection in Roberson and Minnick.
When considering the series of cases after Miranda in which the Court diminished the
Miranda protections by referring to them as “prophylactic,” see, e.g., New York v. Quarles,
467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984); United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 689 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d,
530 U.S. 428, 437–38 (2000), one commentator characterized the holding in Edwards as
“striden[t],” Barton, supra note 39, at 485. In Maryland v. Shatzer, the Court referred to the
same holding as the “Edwards’ super-prophylactic rule.” 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1221 n.3 (2010).
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to questioning by other jurisdictions, encompassing the
discussion of unrelated matters, and possessing no articulated
durational limitation, threatens to pressure courts to discharge
the mandate of Edwards in a begrudging and potentially
undermining manner. A defendant may be more likely to be
seen as having insufficiently invoked his right to counsel during
197
custodial interrogation.
IV. THE MEANING OF A SUSPECT’S INVOCATION OF MIRANDA RIGHTS
The previous sections examined the Supreme Court’s tortured
interpretation of Miranda’s landmark Fifth Amendment holding
regarding the distinction between a suspect’s invocation of her right to
silence and her right to counsel during custodial interrogation. In those
sections I disputed the legal basis for the distinction drawn by the
Court’s interpretation of Miranda and the Fifth Amendment itself. This
section will address the likelihood that a suspect in custody means
something different when he invokes one right as opposed to the other.
A. The Distinction Between the Rights to Silence and Counsel Does Not
Honor the Suspect’s Choice
The police are required to inform suspects in custodial interrogation
of their rights to silence and counsel because—as the Court in Miranda
held—it is the only way to break the coercive atmosphere that attends
198
such questioning. In cases subsequent to Miranda, the Court held that
when a suspect invokes his right to counsel the suspect is indicating he is
utterly helpless to respond to police questioning ever without the
199
presence of counsel.
Invoking the right to silence—according to the
Court—means only that the suspect wishes not to answer questions at
200
Apparently, this is true even if the
that particular point in time.
suspect’s invocation of counsel is “I don’t wish to talk until after I
201
consult with counsel” or if his invocation of the right to silence is, “I

197. Eugene L. Shapiro, Thinking the Unthinkable: Recasting the Presumption of
Edwards v. Arizona, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 11, 18 (2000).
198. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 465, 471 (1966).
199. See, e.g., Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988) (noting that a suspect
invokes his right to counsel if he “believes that he is not capable of
undergoing . . . questioning without advice of counsel”).
200. See Strauss, supra note 71, at 385.
201. See, e.g., Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 165 (1990).
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202

don’t ever want to speak with the police.”
Given this, it is hard to
maintain that the distinction drawn by the Court is merely an attempt to
203
honor the defendant’s choice.
202. See, e.g., Williams v. Texas, 257 S.W.3d 426, 433–34 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (holding
that law enforcement officers could reinterrogate the defendant even after he invoked his
right to silence by stating: “I want to terminate everything.” (emphasis added)).
203. One of the defenses of the dichotomy created between invocations of the right to
silence and the right to counsel revolves around the idea that one purpose of Miranda was to
give the suspect the choice as to whether to participate in custodial interrogation. See
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458. The dichotomy is said to honor that purpose. See Michigan v.
Mosley, 423 U.S. 99, 109–10 (1975). It would seem that the Court could have honored the
suspect’s choice one of two ways. On one hand, the Court could hold that the police must
discontinue all questioning of a suspect who invokes either his right to silence or his right to
counsel unless the suspect initiates reinterrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473–74. This
position presumes that a suspect who has invoked one of his Miranda rights and then changes
his mind about speaking when reapproached by the police is doing so not as a matter of free
choice, but instead in response to the coercive environment of custodial interrogation.
Mosley, 423 U.S. at 102. In the alternative, the Court could decide that if the police wait
enough time after the suspect invokes a Miranda protection, so as not to badger him, the
police may attempt to interrogate him again. Id. at 106. In such a situation, if the suspect
changes his mind, the Court could view this as honoring his choice and allow such a statement
to be used at the suspect’s trial. Id. at 103–04.
The Court chose neither of these paths. Id. at 102. Instead it distinguished invocation of
the right to silence from the right to counsel because the latter demonstrates the helplessness
of the suspect to handle himself without the protection of counsel; whereas, choosing to
remain silent does not mean the suspect will choose to remain silent at all future times. Id. at
103–04; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471. The suspect’s request for silence has been honored when
the police stopped questioning, so they may later resume the questioning without having
denied the suspect the choice he made when invoking his right to silence. Mosley, 423 U.S. at
106. The suspect saying he wanted an attorney, however, has not had his invocation honored,
or his choice respected, if the police approach him again absent his having counsel. Id. at
109–10. In summing up this position as to why invocations of silence and counsel are different
one commentator observed,
The request for a lawyer is different because it admits a structural disadvantage, the
very disadvantage at the heart of Miranda’s desire for a level playing field that
permits free choices in the interrogation room. In short, the suspect’s autonomy is
undermined more when the right to counsel is ignored.
George C. Thomas III & Richard A. Leo, The Effects of Miranda v. Arizona: “Embedded” in
Our National Culture?, 29 CRIME & JUST. 203, 228 (Michael Tonry ed., 2002).
This explanation for the assertion that application of the Mosley–Edwards dichotomy to
reinterrogation respects the suspect’s choice to invoke silence or counsel is highly debatable
for several reasons. Regarding invocation of the right to counsel, the holding in Davis—
which permitted government agents to ignore ambiguous invocations of the right to counsel
and therefore does not require the agents clarify the suspect’s actual choice regarding
whether he wanted counsel present—suggests that honoring the suspect’s choice is not at the
heart of the Edwards protection. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). Regarding
invocation of the right to silence, the fact that a suspect’s expressed or implied choice not to
speak with the police—invocation of the right to silence—can be overcome by application of
the factors enumerated in Mosley suggests the same lack of concern for the suspect’s choice.
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It is important then to understand what, if any, real difference exists
when the custodial suspect invokes the right to counsel, rather than the
right to silence. It is the domination that accompanies being removed
from friends and family and placed in complete police control,
combined with the pressure placed on suspects to respond to police
questioning, that provides the compulsion necessary to trigger the
204
protections of the Fifth Amendment.
In such a coercive situation,
according to the Court, the suspect is expressing a desire for completely
different treatment when he invokes his right to counsel than when he
205
invokes his right to silence.
The Edwards principle, as described in Roberson, is that a suspect
who invokes his right to counsel is manifesting his inability to ever deal
206
with police questioning without an attorney being present.
This,
according to the Court, is a different and more permanent helplessness
207
than that manifested by the suspect who invokes his right to silence.
The Court offers no support for the characterization it places on the
words of such a suspect. It is incumbent, therefore, to examine whether
support for the attachment of these meanings to the suspect’s invocation
of the two rights exists.
Several assumptions undergird the distinction the Court created
here. The first assumption is that the suspect in this coercive
environment is intending to say something different when he invokes
208
the right to silence than when he invokes the right to counsel. Either
See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 110 n.2 (White, J., concurring). Perhaps most profoundly, the
interpretations of Mosley by lower courts—which have legitimated police tactics of
reapproaching suspects in manners that clearly demonstrate badgering and therefore nullify
free choice—are further evidence that real freedom of choice is not served by the dichotomy.
See infra notes 222–35 and accompanying text; see also Strauss, supra note 71, at 385
(observing that if preserving choice is the goal, “the results in Mosley and Edwards are likely
irreconcilable”).
204. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1219 (2010) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at
456–57, 467 (1966)) (referring to the “‘inherently compelling pressures’ of custodial
interrogation,” the “‘incommunicado interrogation’ in an ‘unfamiliar,’ ‘police-dominated
atmosphere,’” and discussing “pressures ‘which work to undermine the individual’s will to
resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely’”).
205. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473–74.
206. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 480 (1981); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S.
675, 686 (1988).
207. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484.
208. But see Strauss, supra note 71, at 385 (“In essence, the justification for permitting
reinterrogation when the suspect invokes the right to remain silent, but not when he invokes
the right to counsel, is weak at best. In both cases, the subject is telling the police that he
chooses not to cooperate or assist in the investigation. The accused is as emphatic when
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of these invocations requires the police to stop their questioning. The
defendant is aware of this because he is told that the questioning will
209
resume only if he waives both rights.
Thus, he probably knows by
claiming either right, he will achieve his immediate end, which is to stop
the questioning. It requires a leap of faith to believe that a suspect in
custodial interrogation means something different when invoking his
right to counsel as opposed to his right to silence given his likely
understanding that either will achieve his goal of preventing subsequent
210
questioning. This is true for both the first time arrestee—who may not
be aware of his ability to stop questioning until he receives his
warnings—and for those more experienced with the criminal justice
system, in other words, those who know that questioning will in fact
cease if they invoke either right.
It is useful to bear in mind that the legal ramifications of the
invocation of the right to counsel have nothing to do with the
defendant’s representation by counsel at trial or during other aspects of
the adversarial process.
That right is protected by the Sixth
211
Amendment.
The right to counsel protected under the Fifth
Amendment, as identified in Miranda, deals only with the right to
212
counsel in situations of custodial interrogation.
Perhaps more
important is that the suspect generally understands this reality (that the
right to counsel here pertains to the police questioning) even though he
is unlikely to know the legal reason why. Some incarnations of the
Miranda warnings explicitly say that the suspect has the right to counsel
both before and during police questioning, while others imply it in one
insisting he will not speak as when he declines to speak without his attorney.”)
209. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444–45.
210. See Kamisar, supra note 152, at 157; see also Thrutchley, supra note 109, at 197. As
Yale Kamisar says:
The average person has no idea that different procedural safeguards are triggered
by saying “I want to see a lawyer” (or “I don’t want to say anything until I see a
lawyer”) rather than “I don’t want to say anything” (or “I don’t want to talk to
you”). If, after being advised both of his right to remain silent and his right to
counsel, a suspect replies that he wishes to remain silent, he may really be saying
that he wants to remain silent until he sees a lawyer. Indeed, I would argue that if,
immediately after being informed of his right to remain silent and his right to
counsel, the suspect responds “I don’t want to say anything” he is invoking both
rights.
Kamisar, supra note 152, at 157 (emphasis omitted).
211. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 27–34; Barton, supra note 39, at 485 (citing
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485–86 (1981)).
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way or another.
With this knowledge in hand, the defendant likely
knows that the invocation of either right will stop the questioning.
What the defendant is very unlikely to know, however, lies at the
heart of the second assumption that supports differential treatment of
invocation of the rights to silence and counsel. Few suspects will know
that an uncounseled suspect can be reinterrogated after he invokes
silence, but cannot be reinterrogated after invoking counsel except if he
214
initiates discussion of the crime. Unlike the Miranda requirement that
a suspect in custody be told that he has the right to stop all questioning
by invoking silence or counsel, there is no requirement that a suspect be
told the difference in invoking the two rights created by the holdings in
Mosley and Edwards. It stretches credulity to think that a suspect is
ever told of this distinction by the police. Without such knowledge, it is
clear that the suspect’s decision regarding which Miranda right to invoke
is not based on his desire to avoid reinterrogation in one instance and
permit it later in the other. This realization leads to the conclusion that
the Mosley/Edwards distinction does not exist to preserve the choice of

213. While the warnings must contain the four essentials enumerated in Miranda, the
Court has permitted nuanced, different wordings of the warnings. See, e.g., Duckworth v.
Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202–03 (1989) (holding that Miranda advisement need not be given in
the exact form described in the Miranda decision and that it is enough that the advisement
reasonably conveys the Miranda rights to a suspect); California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 355–
57 (1981) (holding that while the warnings must contain the four essential elements set forth
in Miranda, the warnings need not be a virtual incantation of the precise language in Miranda,
and different wordings of the warnings are permitted). Accordingly, different law
enforcement authorities have used slightly different versions of the warnings. An example of
many such versions is:
You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in
court. You have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any
questions, and to have him with you during questioning. You have this right to the
advice and presence of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire one. We have no
way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and
when you go to court. If you wish to answer questions now without a lawyer
present, you have the right to stop answering questions at any time. You also have
the right to stop answering at any time until you’ve talked to a lawyer.
Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 198 (emphasis omitted). To examine how versions may differ,
compare Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 198, with Prysock, 453 U.S. at 356–57.
214. This would require the suspect to have knowledge of the Mosley–Edwards
dichotomy with respect to the different requirements for reinterrogation of suspects who
invoke the right to silence and those invoking their counsel right, and perhaps, depending on
the custodial situation involved, also the extensions of the Edwards protection in Roberson
(to different crimes) and Minnick (even after the suspect has met with counsel). It states the
obvious to say that this is highly unlikely. See Kamisar, supra note 152, at 157; Strauss, supra
note 71, at 385; Thrutchley, supra note 109, at 197.
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the suspect regarding his submission to later reinterrogation.

B. Invocations of the Rights to Silence and Counsel are Equally
Threatened by Police Badgering
If the distinction the Court draws between invocations of the right to
silence and the right to counsel cannot be supported by the notion of
honoring the choice of a suspect, what remains in support of this
distinction is the idea that the suspect who invokes counsel is being
badgered if the police reinitiate questioning of him in the absence of
counsel, but is not being badgered if he is reinterrogated after invoking
his right to silence. In several post-Edwards decisions, the Court made
clear that the Court’s intent in Edwards was to prohibit badgering
216
arising from uncounseled, police-initiated reinterrogations.
In
217
Michigan v. Harvey, the Court wrote, “Edwards thus established
another prophylactic rule designed to prevent police from badgering a
218
defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.”
In
Minnick, the Court quoted this language approvingly and added, “The
rule ensures that any statement made in subsequent interrogation is not
219
the result of coercive pressures.” In Roberson, the Court asserted that
once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, it is presumed that any
220
subsequent waiver is the product of “inherently compelling pressures,”
and that postinvocation questioning, even three days later about a
separate crime, “will surely exacerbate whatever compulsion to speak
221
the suspect may be feeling.”
It may very well be true that postinvocation questioning of suspects
who invoke their right to counsel exacerbates compulsion, but if so,
there is no reason why that is not equally true of the suspect who has
invoked his right to silence. Several commentators have noted that the
risk of coercion for a suspect who invokes his right to silence while in
custody is every bit as substantial as one who invokes the right to
222
counsel.
A review of cases illustrates that suspects can be badgered
215. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
216. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146
(1990); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
217. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344.
218. Id. at 350.
219. Minnick, 498 U.S. at 151.
220. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 681 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)).
221. Id. at 686.
222. Thomas, supra note 203, at 228 (arguing that the risk of compulsion is the same
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into waiving their previously invoked right to silence and that the
holding in Mosley does little to avoid this badgering.
223
In Grant v. Warden, the defendant was taken to the hospital for
224
surgery.
“The first interview began at 4:26 a.m., just after [the]
surgery. . . . Detectives [told Grant] that they wanted to talk with [him]
about his mother-in-law and attempted to advise [him] of his [Miranda]
225
rights,” but ended the interview because Grant “was not coherent.”
When a second interview was “attempted at 9:51 a.m., another
detective . . . explained [to Grant] that he was investigating the . . . case
226
and advised Grant of his Miranda rights.” Next, Grant stated that “his
227
throat was sore” and “he did not want to talk.” At 11:45 a.m., one of
the detectives returned and again advised the defendant of his Miranda
228
rights.
Again, “Grant . . . [responded] that he did not want to talk
because his throat was sore and indicated that he could not write
229
Again, at 1:42 p.m., the detective
because his hands were sore.”
230
returned and readvised Grant of his Miranda rights.
The defendant
“acknowledged his rights” and the following conversation took place:
Detective: Okay. Now, having all those rights which I just
explained to you in mind, do you wish to answer questions at this
time?
Grant: No.
Detective: What’s that?
Grant: No.
Detective: No?
Grant: (inaudible) answer any questions.
Detective: What’s that?
Grant: I don’t want to answer any questions.
Detective: You don’t want to answer any questions?

regardless of whether the defendant invokes the right to silence or the right to counsel);
Wolff, supra note 83, at 1180 (calling the distinction “illogical” and asserting that the risk of
coercion is equal for both the right to silence and the right to counsel).
223. Grant v. Warden, 616 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Grant v.
Barnhart, 131 S. Ct. 948 (2011).
224. Id. at 73.
225. Id. at 73–74.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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231

The next morning, at 9:03 a.m., “after learning from Grant’s nurses
that he had not been given pain medication since the previous
afternoon,” the detective again advised Grant of his rights, and this time
232
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Grant agreed to talk.
upheld the state supreme court’s finding that the officers scrupulously
233
honored the defendant’s right to silence.
After Grant expressed doubts about whether to continue the
questioning during the 9:03 am interview, the Detective stated, “I’m not
here twisting your arm or anything. You know there are certain things
that we obviously . . . we obviously know . . . . You know that this is
234
what we do for a living.”
Grant argued that the detective badgered
235
him into waiving his right to remain silent. In rejecting this argument,
the First Circuit adopted the reasoning of the court below with respect
to badgering:
In the matter before us, the record establishes that the police
immediately ceased their questioning of Grant when he invoked
his Miranda right to remain silent during the 1:42 p.m.
interrogation. They did not speak to him through the remainder
of the afternoon and evening, and did not return until 9:03 a.m.
the following day. It is also clear that, when questioning did
resume, Grant was given fresh Miranda warnings, which he
acknowledged that he understood. The subject matter of the
police questioning at 9:03 a.m. on the day after Grant invoked his
Miranda right to remain silent was the same as it had been the
previous day.
Given these facts, we have no difficulty saying that two of the
four factors militate in favor of a conclusion that Grant’s
invocation of his right to remain silent was scrupulously honored:
(1) questioning ceased as soon as Grant invoked his right to
remain silent without further badgering or pressure to speak, and
(2) Grant was given fresh warnings before being questioned
236
again.

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 78, 80.
Id. at 74.
See id. at 78.
State v. Grant, 939 A.2d 93, 106 (Me. 2008).
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237

In Jackson v. Dugger, “Jackson was arrested by the Florida
Highway Patrol at 11:39 a.m. . . . and invoked his right to remain silent
238
after being given his Miranda warnings.”
Forty-five minutes to an
hour later, another detective arrived and readvised Jackson of his
239
Miranda rights.
Three hours later, Jackson was again advised of his
240
Miranda rights and again asserted his right to remain silent. In total,
Dade County officials advised Jackson of his rights four more times over
241
the next six hours. At 6:15 p.m., Jackson made a statement giving the
242
location of the victim’s body. Jackson then indicated that he desired
counsel, but law enforcement officials did not provide him with an
243
244
attorney.
Subsequently, Jackson gave a formal written confession.
The state trial court concluded that the formal written confession was
inadmissible but allowed all statements made prior to Jackson’s request
245
for counsel. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
246
also found that Jackson’s right to silence was scrupulously honored.
The court reasoned that because a significant period of time (six hours)
passed between the first invocation of the right to remain silent and the
time of the confession, Jackson’s right to silence was scrupulously
247
honored.
The court also noted that the repeated advisement of
Miranda rights merely showed that the police were diligent in informing
Jackson of his rights, not that the police were attempting to coerce
248
Jackson into confessing.
249
In Lanosa v. Frank, the defendant was sitting in a stolen car when
250
At 7:30 a.m. the next morning, Detective Silva
he was arrested.
251
advised Lanosa of his rights and gave him a Miranda waiver form. At

237. Jackson v. Dugger, 837 F.2d 1469 (11th Cir. 1988).
238. Id. at 1471.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1472.
248. Id.
249. Lanosa v. Frank, No. 07-00115, 2007 WL 2746839 (D. Haw. Sept. 17, 2007), aff’d,
304 F.App’x. 565 (9th Cir. 2008).
250. Id. at *4.
251. Id.
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7:50 a.m., Lanosa indicated on the form that he understood his rights,
but said that “he did not want to talk,” at which point the interrogation
252
ended.
When the Detective stepped out of the room, he overheard
another detective, Detective Lee, “discussing a separate
253
investigation.”
Upon hearing this discussion, Silva told Lee that
Lanosa “might fit the description of the suspect he was looking for in
254
connection with various sexual assaults and burglaries.” A mere ten
minutes later, at 8:00 a.m., “Lee moved [Lanosa] to another room and
started an interrogation about the sexual assaults and burglaries,” with
255
Detective Silva present. Before the second interrogation, Lanosa was
given a new copy of the Miranda waiver form and readvised of his
256
Miranda rights by Lee. Within twelve minutes, Lanosa again indicated
that he understood his rights by signing the appropriate portion of the
waiver form. At 8:40 a.m., Lanosa signed the portion of the waiver form
indicating that he waived his rights; however, he did not make a
257
statement “and asked if he could return to his cell to think.” The court
regarded this request as another invocation of Lanosa’s right to
258
silence. Upon Lanosa’s request, the interrogation was ended and he
259
Two hours later, at 10:40 a.m., a third
was returned to his cell.
detective, Detective Holokai, retrieved Lanosa from his cell to question
260
him about an unrelated burglary.
Before Detective Holokai had a
chance to begin the interrogation, Detective Lee interrupted “and
261
initiated a third interrogation.”
At that time Lee again advised
Lanosa of his Miranda rights, presented him a copy of the Miranda
waiver, which he had signed during the prior interrogation with
262
Detective Lee, and asked Lanosa if was willing to talk. At 10:50 a.m.,
Lanosa filled out a voluntary statement form and made incriminating
statements in response to Lee’s questions about the sexual assaults and
263
burglaries.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Court held that Lanosa’s right to silence was scrupulously
honored based primarily on the fact that Lanosa was given fresh
264
Miranda warnings before each interrogation.
While Lanosa
contended that the ten minutes between the first two interrogations was
not a reasonable amount of time under Mosley, the court stated that the
time between the interrogations must be taken as a whole, and thus the
total of two hours and ten minutes between the three interrogations was
sufficient to show that Lanosa’s invocation of his right to silence had
265
been scrupulously honored. It is thus apparent that the effects of
police badgering are every bit as significant for suspects who invoke
their right to silence as for those who invoke their right to counsel. All
of the assumptions that have been or could be used by the Court to
support the distinction it has drawn between reinterrogating suspects in
custody who invoke their right to silence and those who invoke their
right to counsel are unsupportable. Similarly, the jurisprudential and
constitutional justifications offered by the Court in cases that have
drawn the same distinction are equally flawed. It is time now to
consider how the Court can extricate itself from the situation it created
by establishing and developing this distinction in Mosley, Edwards, and
subsequent holdings in this area.
V. TOWARDS AN APPROACH THAT IS BOTH SIMPLER AND FAIRER
In the previous Parts, this article argued that the differential
treatment surrounding the reinterrogation of suspects in custody who
invoke their right to silence and those who invoke their right to counsel
is unsupportable both theoretically and pragmatically. This Section
examines two recent decisions of the Supreme Court that have paved
the way towards abandoning this problematic distinction. It will then
offer and defend an approach for dealing with custodial suspects who
invoke their right to silence that is consistent with the Court’s new
approach regarding suspects who request counsel.
264. Id. at *7.
265. Id. For more examples of badgering permitted under Mosley, see Jackson v.
Wyrick, 730 F.2d 1177, 1178, 1180 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that defendant’s right to silence
was scrupulously honored when he was questioned four times over a two day period); State v.
Lewingdon, No. C-790488, 1980 WL 352986, at *3, *11–12 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 24, 1980)
(holding that the defendant’s right to silence had been scrupulously honored after three
interrogation sessions, with the defendant confessing less than half an hour after his last
invocation of the right to silence); Dennis v. State, 561 P.2d 88, 96–97 (Okla. Crim. App.
1977) (holding the defendant’s statement admissible when he was interrogated four times
within a twelve hour time period and given nothing to eat during that time).
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In Berghuis v. Thompkins and Maryland v. Shatzer, both
decided in 2010, the Supreme Court pointed the way towards a means of
ending this unwarranted Mosley/Edwards distinction. Neither the
Thompkins nor the Shatzer Court actually addressed the propriety of
the distinction between reinterrogation between suspects who invoke
268
right to silence and who invoke their right to counsel.
In both
decisions, however, this distinction was not relevant to the outcome of
the case before the Court, so there is no reason to expect that the
269
distinction would have been addressed. Significantly though, in both
Thompkins and Shatzer the Court enumerated several ways in which
invocations of the right to silence deserve similar treatment to
invocations of the right to counsel and identified the purposes behind
270
these rights that also apply to both invocations. Then, in Shatzer, the
Court developed a new approach for dealing with reinterrogation of
suspects in custody who invoke the right to counsel that works equally
271
well for suspects in custody who invoke the right to silence.
A. Berghuis v. Thompkins
Two related, but analytically severable, issues were before the Court
in Thompkins. The first was whether the defendant’s silence during the
interrogation served as an invocation of his right to silence under
272
Miranda. The second issue concerned whether Thompkins waived his
right to silence by answering police questions without ever directly
273
acknowledging he understood his Miranda rights.
After being given
his Miranda rights, Thompkins never expressly invoked them nor did he
274
ever directly waive them. In fact, Thompkins remained largely silent
during a three-hour interrogation by the police regarding his
275
participation in a murder.
About two hours and forty-five minutes
266. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).
267. Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010).
268. See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2259–60, 2263–64; Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1223.
269. See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2260 (dealing with what constitutes invocation of the
right to silence; Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1217 (addressing whether the Edwards protection was
eternal).
270. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2260; Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1219–20.
271. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1223.
272. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2259.
273. Id. at 2260.
274. Id. at 2262.
275. Id. at 2256. During the interrogation Thompkins gave “a few limited verbal
responses, however, such as ‘yeah,’ ‘no,’ or ‘I don’t know[]’ [a]nd on occasion he
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into the interrogation, Thompkins was asked if he believed in God and
276
whether he prayed to God to forgive him for the shooting.
He
answered, “yes” to both questions, and these words were admitted
277
Thompkins argued to the Supreme
against Thompkins at his trial.
Court that the admission of these statements at trial violated his right to
278
silence.
The Court ruled both that Thompkins never invoked his right to
279
silence, and that he affirmatively waived his rights under Miranda.
Regarding the first issue, the Court held that to invoke one’s right to
silence during custodial interrogation, the defendant must make an
280
unambiguous manifestation of his intent.
It concluded that
281
On the
Thompkins’ silence was not an unambiguous manifestation.
waiver issue, Thompkins argued that previous cases had made clear that
silence plus a statement regarding the crime does not constitute a waiver
282
of one’s Miranda rights.
The Court rejected Thompkins’ argument,
holding that a waiver need not be express in order to satisfy the
283
requirements emanating from Miranda.
As long as the waiver is
knowing and voluntary, it satisfies the requirements of the Fifth
284
Amendment and Miranda, according to the Court.
The Court said
that, in this case, Thompkins’ statement was not the product of police
coercion and was made only after he had full knowledge of his right to
285
remain silent. In so holding, the Court maintained that the absence of
any indication that Thompkins did not understand his rights after having
them administered, in combination with his voluntary choice to respond
286
to a police question, demonstrated that he had waived his rights.
Speaking for four Justices in dissent, Justice Sotomayor expressed it
communicated by nodding his head.” Id. at 2256–57.
276. Id. at 2257.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 2259.
279. Id. at 2260, 2262.
280. Id. at 2259–60.
281. Id. at 2260.
282. See id.
283. Id. at 2261.
284. Id. at 2260.
285. Id. at 2262–63.
286. Id. at 2262. The Court noted that Thompkins read the warnings, and “read aloud
the fifth warning, which stated that ‘you have the right to decide at any time before or during
questioning to use your right to remain silent and your right to talk with a lawyer while you
are being questioned,’” and therefore was aware that police would have to honor his right to
silence and to counsel during the whole course of the interrogation. Id.
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strange that one has to speak in order to assert his right not to speak.
Additionally, she maintained that the majority opinion ignored previous
decisions that held that silence plus a statement about the crime does
not constitute a waiver, and that holding otherwise violates the explicit
language of Miranda requiring the government to meet a “heavy
288
burden” to show a waiver of the Miranda protections.
B. Maryland v. Shatzer
Maryland v. Shatzer addressed the issue of whether the protection
conferred upon suspects who invoke their right to counsel during
289
custodial interrogation is interminable. As discussed above, the Court
held in Edwards that once a suspect requests counsel during custodial
interrogation, he cannot be questioned again about the crime while in
custody unless counsel is present or the defendant initiates the
290
questioning. In Shatzer, the Court confronted a situation in which the
authorities interrogated the defendant about the sexual abuse of his
son—2 1/2 years after he invoked his right to counsel when first
291
questioned about the incident.
The Court ruled that the 2 1/2 year
break in custody between the two interrogations was sufficient to
obviate the need for the Edwards initiation protection to continue to
292
exist.
There were several notable aspects to the Court’s decision in
Shatzer. First, the Court considered whether the fact that Shatzer spent
2 1/2 years between interrogations as a prisoner in the state correctional
293
system constituted a break in custody.
The Court held that because
being part of a general prison population did not produce the same
coercive police pressures as custodial interrogation, Shatzer’s time in
prison could be viewed as a break in custody for purposes of
294
determining whether the protections of Edwards were applicable.
287. Id. at 2266 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
288. See id. at 2269.
289. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1217 (2010); see also supra note 91 and
accompanying text.
290. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981).
291. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1217–18.
292. Id. at 1223.
293. Id. at 1224.
294. Id. at 1224–25. In Howes v. Field, the Court made it even more difficult for a
suspect already in prison to have his interrogation determined to be custodial (and therefore
be entitled to the protections of Miranda), even when the questioning goes on for hours and is
conducted in an interrogation room. 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1190–92 (2012).
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Next, the Court reasoned that when a suspect is no longer in custody, he
has the opportunity to consult with family, friends, and counsel in an
atmosphere far different than the pressures that accompany custodial
295
interrogations.
After such a break in custody, the Court held, a
defendant’s change of mind regarding speaking with the police without
counsel while in custody is less likely to be attributable to the police
296
badgering that Edwards was designed to prevent. Having reached this
conclusion, the Court next considered how to determine when such a
297
break in custody obviates the need for the Edwards protection. The
Court chose to come up with a fixed period of fourteen days, as the
minimum period of time for which the break in custody will permit the
government to initiate the reinterrogation of an uncounseled defendant
298
now back in custody.
C. Undercutting the Distinction Between the Rights to Silence and
Counsel
In both the Thompkins and Shatzer decisions, the Court drew
several conclusions that significantly undercut the distinction between
the requirements for reinterrogating a suspect who invokes his right to
silence during custodial interrogation and a suspect who invokes his
299
right to counsel.
In Davis v. United States, the Court held that to
300
invoke one’s right to counsel, the invocation must be unambiguous.
Prior to the decision in Thompkins, the Court had never applied that
301
same principle to the invocation of the right to silence. In doing so the
Thompkins Court wrote, “[T]here is no principled reason to adopt
different standards for determining when an accused has invoked the
302
Miranda right to remain silent and the Miranda right to counsel.” In
elucidating its reasons for treating the two invocations the same way, the
Court made clear that the similarities between the invocations of the
303
two rights go beyond that one issue.
The Court quoted approvingly
from what it wrote twenty-six years earlier in another case: “‘[M]uch of
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1221.
Id.
Id. at 1222.
Id. at 1227.
See id. at 1219–20; Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010).
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2260.
Id.
Id.
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the logic and language of [Mosley],’ which discussed the Miranda right
to remain silent, ‘could be applied to the invocation of the [Miranda
304
right to counsel].’” The Court then noted another similarity between
invocation of the two rights—that in protecting the Fifth Amendment
right against compulsory self-incrimination, an invocation of either right
305
compels the police to end an interrogation.
Not only are the standards for invocation of the Miranda rights to
silence and counsel the same, but so too—according to the Court—are
306
the requirements to show that each right has been waived.
The
decision in Thompkins speaks to how Miranda rights can be validly
307
waived implicitly as well as explicitly.
At one point the Court
observed that, “Miranda rights can therefore be waived through means
less formal than a typical waiver on the record in a courtroom given the
practical constraints and necessities of interrogation and the fact that
308
Miranda’s main protection lies in advising defendants of their rights.”
The fact that the Court here is not distinguishing between the right to
silence and the right to counsel is clear from the words themselves as
well as the fact that it cites to Davis, a case addressing the right to
counsel. Similarly, the Court in Thompkins noted that a suspect in
309
custody might revoke his or her waiver at any time.
In such a
circumstance, “[i]f the right to counsel or the right to remain silent is
invoked at any point during questioning, further interrogation must
310
cease.”
An important thread woven through the Shatzer opinion relates to
the impact of continued custody on the suspect regarding
reinterrogation and the importance of his being able to make an
uncoerced choice as to whether he wishes to respond to police
311
questions. In referring to suspects in custody who invoke their right to
304. Id. (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 648 (1984)).
305. Id. (citing Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103 (1975); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S.
707, 718 (1979)).
306. Id. (noting that waiver of Miranda rights must be both voluntary and made with
awareness of the nature of the right and the consequences of waiver).
307. Id. at 2261.
308. Id. at 2262 (citation omitted).
309. Id. at 2263.
310. Id. at 2263–64.
311. Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1220 (2010); see also Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at
2264. The Court noted in Thompkins:
Interrogation provides the suspect with additional information that can put his or
her decision to waive, or not to invoke, into perspective. As questioning commences
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counsel, the Shatzer Court noted that requests to reinterrogate such
suspects “pose a significantly greater risk of coercion” than does the
312
initial attempt to interrogate those suspects.
Although the Court in
Shatzer was dealing with—and therefore referring to—a defendant who
had invoked his right to counsel, the risk of greater coercion it was
referring to certainly should apply in a similar manner to the
reinterrogation of suspects who invoke their right to silence. This is
clear from the Court’s explanation of the greater risk: “That increased
risk results not only from the police’s persistence in trying to get the
suspect to talk, but also from the continued pressure that begins when
the individual is taken into custody as a suspect and sought to be
313
interrogated—pressure likely to ‘increase as custody is prolonged.’”
The Court later refers to the “mounting coercive pressures” of
314
continued police custody. It seems beyond dispute that regardless of
whether one invokes his right to silence or counsel, the risks of
315
prolonged custody, described by the Court above, pertain.
The Court in Shatzer returned to familiar themes concerning the
precise nature of the coercion referred to above that attends custodial
interrogation and particularly the time between when questioning is cut
316
off and the next interrogation. Referring to the right to counsel that
was invoked in Shatzer, the Court spoke of how a suspect could be
badgered into changing his mind about speaking with the police during
317
continued uninterrupted custody.
The Court quoted Miranda
regarding how a suspect in custody is separated from friends and family,
and then continues, the suspect has the opportunity to consider the choices he or she
faces and to make a more informed decision, either to insist on silence or to
cooperate. When the suspect knows that Miranda rights can be invoked at any time,
he or she has the opportunity to reassess his or her immediate and long-term
interests.
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264.
312. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1220.
313. Id. (quoting Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990)).
314. Id.
315. Before the holding in Shatzer, several commentators had already asserted that any
statement made after a custodial suspect invokes his right to silence is just as likely to be the
product of impermissible police coercion as a statement from the suspect who asks for
counsel. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 39, at 487; Dripps, supra note 32, at 16; Thomas, supra
note 203, at 228; Wolff, supra note 83, at 1180.
316. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1222–23 (discussing different lengths of time sufficient to
relieve a suspect of the inherent coercion of being in custody and concluding that fourteen
days suffices to eliminate its coercive effects as well as deter police abuse of the break-incustody rule).
317. Id. at 1220.
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isolated and placed in an unfamiliar environment controlled totally by
318
the police. Such pressures are undoubtedly present for the suspect in
custody who has invoked the right to silence as well as for the suspect
319
who has invoked his right to counsel.
The Shatzer Court then discussed Edwards, Roberson, and Minnick:
three cases in which the police waited a substantial period of time after
the suspect’s invocation of his right to counsel (overnight in Edwards,
three days in Roberson, and two days in Minnick) and in which the
320
suspect was still in custody to attempt to reinterrogate him. Even with
the extended period of time between when questioning was cut off and
when it was resumed in those cases, the Court in Shatzer concluded that,
“[n]one of these suspects regained a sense of control or normalcy after
they were initially taken into custody for the crime under
321
investigation.” In other words, no matter how long the police wait to
reinterrogate a suspect who had invoked his right to counsel, his
continued, uninterrupted custody makes any future response the likely
result of the coercive custodial environment and, thus, inadmissible
322
under Miranda.
Surely Mosley was not able to regain his sense of
323
“control or normalcy” during the much briefer two hours he spent in
324
uninterrupted police custody after he invoked his right to silence. This
is even more obvious for other defendants whose statements have been
allowed into evidence based on an interrogation conducted after as few
as ten minutes following invocation of the same Fifth Amendment
325
protection.
Even if one credits the dubious distinction between
invocation of the right to silence and the right to counsel the Court
created in the Mosley–Edwards line of cases, the coercive pressures of
prolonged custody and subsequent interrogation discussed above are

318. Id.
319. Id. (noting that to counteract the coercive nature of custody, defendants must be
informed of their rights to both silence and counsel); id. at 1229 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(noting that police may coerce a suspect into abandoning his right to silence or his right to
counsel).
320. Id. at 1221 (majority opinion).
321. Id.
322. Id. at 1220–21.
323. Id.
324. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975). At any rate, it is disingenuous to
pretend that the longer amount of time a suspect spends in custody—regardless of how much
time elapses between interrogations—the less pressure he will feel to speak.
325. See, e.g., Lanosa v. Frank, No. 07-00115, 2007 WL 2746839, at *7 (D. Haw. Sept. 17,
2007), aff’d, 304 F. App’x. 565, 566 (9th Cir. 2008).
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similar regardless of which right is invoked.
With respect to invocations of the right to counsel, the solution to
the problems discussed above is to prohibit further police custodial
326
interrogation unless the suspect initiates or has counsel present. The
Supreme Court had never before held that a break in custody before
resuming custodial interrogation could permit a second attempt at
327
uncounseled questioning of a suspect who invokes his right to counsel.
Similarly, the Court had never before held that there was a period of
time between invocation of the right to counsel and a second attempt at
uncounseled custodial interrogation (regardless of whether the suspect
remained in custody), which if long enough, would allow the police to
328
Both of these alternatives to the
reinterrogate the suspect.
interminable nature of the Edwards protection were before the Court in
329
Shatzer. The Court in Shatzer chose the first alternative, holding that
a break in custody of sufficient length reduces the risk that any
interrogation of the suspect made once he is back in custody is likely to
330
be the product of the coercion.
In adopting this new approach to permissible police activity once a
suspect invokes his right to counsel during custodial interrogation, the
Court had two basic questions to answer. First, why does a break in
custody obviate the need for the Edwards protections and, second, what
is the minimum amount of time necessary for the break between
invocation and subsequent custodial interrogation?
The Court’s
responses to these questions demonstrates quite clearly why and how
the approach to what type of interrogation is permitted after invocation
of Miranda’s right to silence needs to be changed as well.
When a suspect is freed from custody, he no longer suffers from the
isolation and police-dominated atmosphere that warrants the

326. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981). For examples of the application
of Edwards, see Van Hook v. Anderson, 488 F.3d 411, 425–26 (6th Cir. 2007) (allowing
reinterrogation after the invocation of the right to counsel where defendant initiated the
conversation); People v. Wright, 651 N.E.2d 758, 764 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding same);
Osburn v. State, 326 S.W.3d 771, 781–82 (Ark. 2009) (suppressing defendant’s statement
made after invocation of the right to counsel when counsel was not present and defendant did
not initiate the conversation).
327. See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1223.
328. Id. at 1223.
329. Id. at 1222 & n.4 (referring to the second argument and noting that there was no
need to address it because the government prevailed on the first argument).
330. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1223.
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protections enumerated in Miranda and subsequent cases.
As the
Court in Shatzer pointed out, the suspect is free to speak with friends,
332
family or an attorney as he wishes. Therefore, the coercion produced
by keeping the suspect in the isolated atmosphere of custody, especially
if that custody is prolonged, has likely been dissipated when he was
333
released. It follows then, that if returned to custody after his release,
any waiver of Miranda rights that precedes a new attempt at
interrogation is less likely to be the product of the police having worn
down the suspect’s resistance. In the Court’s words, “His change of
331. See United States v. Harris, 221 F.3d 1048, 1053 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that a
three-hour break in custody was sufficient because defendant “had ample opportunity to
consult his family, friends, or a lawyer”); Dunkins v. Thigpen, 854 F.2d 394, 397 & n.6 (11th
Cir. 1988) (stating that if the police release the defendant, and the defendant has a reasonable
opportunity to contact his attorney, there is no reason why Edwards should bar the admission
of any subsequent statements, and noting that there was no argument that the break in
custody was contrived or pretextual); Kochutin v. State, 875 P.2d 778, 780 (Alaska Ct. App.
1994) (holding that a break in custody weighs against presumption of coercion that exists in
situations of custodial interrogation); In re Bonnie H., 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513, 526 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997) (“[A] suspect’s request for counsel during police custodial interrogation followed by a
termination of questioning and a good faith release of custody, one that is not contrived or
pretextual on the part of the police, does not prohibit [subsequent] police-initiated
interrogation.”); People v. Trujillo, 773 P.2d 1086, 1092 (Colo. 1989) (holding that the break
in custody ends the need for the Edwards protections, but noting that “this analysis will not
apply if there is any indication that the release of the defendant was contrived, pretextual or
done in bad faith”); Delaware v. Brotman, CR.A. Nos. IN90-12-1622, IN90-12-1623, 1991 Del.
Super. LEXIS 277 at *24 (July 11, 1991) (“[R]elease from . . . initial custody
provided . . . substantial opportunity to speak with those [the defendant] wished to consult.”);
State v. Bymes, 375 S.E.2d 41, 42 (Ga. 1989) (noting length of break and that “there [was] no
indication appellee’s release from custody was a mere ploy in order to seek another waiver”);
Clark v. Maryland, 781 A.2d 913, 947 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (stating that once a
defendant is released from police custody into incarceration, the restraints of incarceration
are no longer coercive and the Edwards protection dissipates); Commonwealth v. Galford,
597 N.E.2d 410, 414 & n.9 (Mass. 1992) (following the reasoning of United States ex rel.
Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 F.2d 117 (7th Cir. 1987)), cert. denied sub nom. Galford v.
Massachusetts, 506 U.S. 1065 (1993); Willie v. Mississippi, 585 So. 2d 660, 667 (Miss. 1991)
(noting the contrived or pretextual exception, the rationale regarding a defendant’s
reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney, but noting that “[t]his is not to say that in
some cases custody may be of such short duration that the Edwards or Roberson protection
does not dissipate”); Pennsylvania v. Wyatt, 688 A.2d 710, 713 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (stating
that release from police custody provides the defendant “a substantial opportunity to consult
with an attorney before any further contact with the police”); Tennessee v. Furlough, 797
S.W.2d 631, 638 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (noting that the defendant had a break from
custody and “had the opportunity to contact an attorney”); Tennessee v. Kyger, 787 S.W.2d
13, 25 & n.5 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989) (stating that defendant’s release from custody provided
him with “substantial opportunity to consult with counsel” before the next custodial
interrogation, and also noting that this was not a contrived or pretextual break).
332. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1221.
333. See id.
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heart is less likely attributable to ‘badgering’ than it is to the fact that
further deliberation in familiar surroundings has caused him to believe
(rightly or wrongly) that cooperating with the investigation is in his
334
interest.”
While the Court’s conclusion about why such a suspect is
choosing to speak with the police is speculative and questionable, it is
fair to say that the break in custody would seem to make the decision to
speak less influenced by the result of coercion than if the custody had
been continuous from the point of time the suspect invoked his right. If
this is correct, the police—as the Court holds—should be able to seek a
waiver of the suspect’s Miranda rights once he’s back in custody and,
335
upon obtaining one, be permitted to interrogate the suspect.
Having determined that a break in custody can cause the pressures
of custody to dissipate substantially, and thus allow the police to
reinterrogate a suspect who had previously invoked his right to counsel,
the Court then had to determine how long this break in custody had to
last to achieve this desired effect. In coming up with a period of
fourteen days as the minimum length of time for the break in custody to
allow reinterrogation of such a suspect, the Court rejected the view of
Justice Stevens that fourteen days was often not long enough to achieve
336
its ends, and that in any event, is an entirely arbitrary number. Justice
Stevens (concurring) apparently favored a case-by-case determination
337
of whether the duration of the break in custody was long enough. The
Court concluded that fourteen days was sufficient time “for the suspect
to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends and
counsel, and to shake off any residual coercive effects of his prior
338
custody.”
Regarding the contention that fourteen days was an
arbitrary number, the Court acknowledged that it was unusual for it to
339
set such precise time limits regarding police procedures.
The Court
noted, however, that it had set such precise limits before, and went on to
say that setting such time limits was especially appropriate where a
police procedure was required not by statute, but by Supreme Court
334. Id.
335. Id. at 1223.
336. Id. at 1226 (noting that Stevens argues that fourteen days does nothing to eliminate
the rationale for the Edwards rule, and that the majority gives no good basis for its fourteenday rule).
337. Id. at 1230 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The Court never explains why its rule cannot
depend on, in addition to a break in custody and passage of time, a concrete event or state of
affairs, such as the police having honored their commitment to provide counsel.”).
338. Id. at 1223 (majority opinion).
339. Id.
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340

holdings. That is precisely the situation when considering how to treat
invocations of Miranda rights. Weighing in favor of such a definite time,
according to the Court, was the benefit to be achieved by this relatively
bright-line rule that officers will know with certainty when
reinterrogation is permitted after the defendant has been returned to
341
custody.
The Court viewed Justice Stevens’ apparent case-by-case
342
approach to be “less helpful, but not at all less arbitrary.”
The Shatzer Court’s responses to both of the questions posed above
regarding the need for and length required of a break in custody
requirement for custodial suspects invoking their right to counsel apply
343
with equal force to suspects who invoke their right to silence.
First,
the break in custody is needed to dissipate the likelihood that any
statement made after invoking one’s right to silence has been achieved
344
through the coercive effect of continued custody. As discussed above,
the suspect who invokes his right to silence in custody suffers the same
pressures to change his mind—due to the custodial environment—as
345
does one who invokes his right to counsel.
During a break from
custody, the silence-invoking suspect, as is the counsel-invoking suspect,
346
is free from the isolation and domination of police custody.
He can
use this time to consult with friends, family, and counsel about how he
347
Should he change his mind and decide to
should proceed next.
respond to police interrogation once back in custody, this change is “less
likely attributable to ‘badgering’ than it is to the fact that further
deliberation in familiar surroundings has caused him to believe (rightly
348
or wrongly) that cooperating with the investigation is in his interest.”
The current standard for whether a suspect who has invoked his
right to silence while in custody may be reinterrogated depends on

340. Id. The Court noted that in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56
(1991), it specified forty-eight hours as the time within which the police must comply with the
requirement of Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975), that a person arrested without a
warrant be brought before a magistrate to establish probable cause for continued detention.
341. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1222–23.
342. Id. at 1226.
343. Id. at 1223.
344. See id. at 1222 (describing the same need for invocations of the right to counsel).
345. See supra Part II (discussing Mosley); supra note 315 and accompanying text.
346. See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1221.
347. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 221 F.3d 1048, 1053 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting that
during a break in custody a suspect can consult with friends, family, or an attorney).
348. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1221.
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whether this right has been scrupulously honored by the police. Such
a standard is far from the bright-line the Court implemented in Shatzer
350
for reinterrogation of a suspect who invokes counsel. The phrase itself
offers no clear guidance to the police for when they may reinterrogate
such a suspect, and time required—a primary factor created by the
Court in Mosley for determining whether silence has been scrupulously
351
honored—also defies any bright-line application. The Court in Mosley
spoke about the time between invocation of the right to silence and
reinterrogation of the suspect as being a key factor in determining
352
whether his right to silence has been honored.
The Court’s position
353
here was the longer the better. Unlike in Shatzer, however, no specific
354
Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the
time period was required.
opinions of lower courts on the amount of time necessary to
355
scrupulously honor the right to silence are inconsistent. Accordingly,
police are not given clear guidance as to how long they must wait before
reinterrogating a suspect who invokes his right to silence. The need for
a bright-line time period in determining when police can reinterrogate a
suspect who invokes his right to silence is no less necessary than for
determining when a defendant who invokes his right to counsel may be
349. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103 (1975) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 479 (1966)).
350. See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1223 (noting that a fourteen-day break in custody is the
bright-line rule for reinterrogation of an individual who has invoked his right to counsel).
351. See supra note 109.
352. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104.
353. See id. at 102 (“To permit the continuation of custodial interrogation after a
momentary cessation would clearly frustrate the purposes of Miranda by allowing repeated
rounds of questioning to undermine the will of the person being questioned.”).
354. Id. at 104 (noting that the key inquiry was that a reasonable amount of time elapse
between interrogations and holding that two hours was reasonable).
355. See United States v. Thompson, 866 F.2d 268, 271–72 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding
defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights were not violated when law enforcement officers
resumed questioning approximately thirty minutes after defendant had invoked his right to
remain silent); United States v. Hsu, 852 F.2d 407, 411–12 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding same);
Stock v. State, 191 P.3d 153, 155–56, 161 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008) (holding same). But see
United States v. Samuel, No. 09-CR-128A(Sr), 2010 WL 3091934, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. July 14,
2010) (“[T]here can be no dispute that the thirty to forty-five minute interval of time in the
instant case does not constitute a sufficient break in custody for Miranda purposes.”), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 09-CR-128, 2010 WL 3091704, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 5,
2010); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 386 N.E.2d 15, 19 (Mass. 1979) (defendant’s right to silence
not scrupulously honored when there was only thirty minutes between interrogations and
other Mosley factors); Commonwealth v. Callender, 960 N.E.2d 910, 914, 916 (Mass. App. Ct.
2012) (invocation of the right to silence not scrupulously honored when only thirty-five
minutes passed between interrogations).
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356

reinterrogated.
The Court thus laid the groundwork for finally doing away with the
distinction that has existed since Mosley and Edwards. Because the
coercive pressures of custodial reinterrogation are the same whether a
suspect invokes his right to counsel or his right to silence—as are many
other aspects of the two invocations—the ability of the police to
question the suspect regardless of which right he claimed should be the
same as well. The police should not be permitted to reinterrogate a
suspect who invokes his right to silence and remains in police custody
any more than they are allowed to reinterrogate one who invokes his
right to counsel. If the suspect is freed from custody for sufficient time,
then the effects of the original custody, which led the suspect to invoke
his Miranda protection, could be said to have dissipated. As it is
important to give the police clear guidance as to when they can
357
reinterrogate such a suspect, the fourteen-day break-in-custody period
required by the Court in Shatzer regarding counsel invocations should
apply as well to police reinterrogation of suspects who have invoked
their right to silence.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article explored the differential treatment the Supreme Court
has accorded to the reinterrogation of suspects in custody who have
invoked their rights to silence and counsel. It found this differential
356. In fact, in certain situations, the need for a bright-line rule may be greater when the
suspect invokes his right to silence. Comparing an invocation of the right to silence with the
events that occurred in Minnick where the suspect actually spoke with his attorney after
invoking his right to counsel before the police reinterrogated him, Donald Dripps wrote,
“[T]he need for a bright-line rule seems stronger in the case of the right to silence, again
because the absence of defense counsel expands the practical latitude enjoyed by the police.”
Dripps, supra note 32, at 16.
357. One commentator enumerated the benefits of such a bright line as follows:
Obviously clear rules serve many useful purposes. They provide guidance to the
police in determining the constitutionality of interrogations. Specific guidelines are
particularly useful in the area of interrogation where vague, general guidance may
give the police significant leeway to wear down the accused and persuade him to
incriminate himself. Moreover, precise and defined rules help inform the courts in
determining when statements obtained during police interrogations may be properly
suppressed. Judicial resources which would otherwise be expended making difficult
assessments concerning the admissibility of confessions are thus conserved.
Accordingly, specificity in rules benefit the accused and the state alike.
Strauss, supra note 71, at 377 (footnotes omitted).
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treatment to be unsupported by the Fifth Amendment, the decision in
Miranda, or the pragmatic assumptions upon which the distinction was
created and expanded.
This differential treatment has led to judicial opinions that are
inconsistent, unjust, and often nonsensical. In two recent holdings, the
Court has articulated principles behind the Miranda protections that
apply to invocations of the rights to silence and counsel equally. These
principles point the way out of the problems created by treating the
invocation of these rights differently. Whether a suspect in custody
invokes his right to silence or to counsel, custodial reinterrogation
without counsel initiated by the police should be permitted only after a
fourteen-day break in custody. This break in custody allows the suspect
time to consult family, friends, and counsel, and thus, reduces the
likelihood that his reinterrogation once back in custody would be the
product of the very coercion that the Fifth Amendment and Miranda
were designed to prevent.

